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1. Introduction 
The past two decades have witnessed considerable change in managerial accounting 
practice. From its traditional emphasis on financially-oriented decision analysis and 
budgetary control, managerial accounting has ev olv ed to encompass a more strategic 
approach that emphasizes the identification, measurement, and management of the key 
fmancial and operational driv ers of shareholder value (International Federation of 
Accountants, 1998; Institute of Management Accountants, 1999). A similar evolution 
has occurred in managerial accounting research. Empirical studies of budgeting and 
fmancial control practices are giving way to research on a variety of "new" techniques 
such as activity-based costing, the balanced scorecard, strategic accounting and control 
systems, and economic value performance measures. 
Although researchers generally treat these techniques as distinct, companies 
increasingly are integrating these various practices using a comprehensive ''value-based 
management" (hereafter VBM) framework. This approach focuses on (1) defining and 
implementing strategies that provide the highest potential for shareholder value creation; 
(2) implementing information systems focused on value creation and the underlying 
"drivers" ofvalue across a company 's business units, products, and customer segments; 
(3) aligning management processes, such as business planning and resource allocation, 
with value creation; and ( 4) designing performance measurement systems and incentive 
compensation plans that reflect value creation (KPMG Consulting, 1999; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999). 
This paper applies a value-based management framework to critically review 
empirical research in managerial accounting. Given the breadth of managerial 
accounting research methods and topics, it is impossible for a single paper to adequately 
summarize the entire field. Instead, we limit our review to organization-level studies that 
use archival or survey data to examine issues related to the VBM perspective. These 
criteria lead us to exclude most behavioral research, experimental studies, and qualitative 
case research. We also exclude much of the compensation literature, which is covered in 
comprehensive review papers by Pavlik et al. ( 1993), Murphy (1998), and Bushman and 
Smith (this issue), among others. 
We adopt the VBM framework for three reasons.1 First, VBM represents an 
extension of traditional management planning and control frameworks (e.g., Anthony, 
1965) and contingency theories of managerial accounting system design (e.g., Gordon 
and Miller, 1976; Hayes, 1977; Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Otley, 1980), and is 
consistent with economic models of managerial accounting practices. This evolutionary 
link allows us to apply evidence from several decades of research to the study of 
contemporary practices. Second, the VBM perspective explicitly incorporates a wide 
variety of recent " innovations" in managerial accounting practice, such as activ ity-based 
costing and the balanced scorecard, that are ignored in many managerial accounting 
frameworks. Third, analytical and empirical research in managerial accounting tends to 
be motivated by changes in practice. By focusing on an emerging trend in managerial 
accounting (KPMG Consulting, 1999; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999), we attempt to 
1 The value-based management framework used in this paper is an adaptation of similar frameworks 
developed by a number of accounting and consulting firms. For discussions of the value-based 
management frameworks developed by Deloitte & Touche, McKinsey & Co., KPMG Peat Marwick, and 
provide insight into the applicability and benefits of the normative VBM framework, and 
to identify fruitful avenues for future research. 
The remainder of the paper is organized into five sections. Section 2 outlines the 
simple value-based management framework used to guide our review, and discusses the 
framework's links to other conceptual models and economic theories in the managerial 
accounting literature. Section 3 offers our overall assessment of empirical research in 
managerial accounting. Section 4 critically reviews studies relating to each step in the 
value-based management process and identifies potential research topics. Section 5 
discusses our views on the steps needed to advance empirical managerial accounting 
research in the future. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 6. 
2. Overview of the Value-Based Management Approach 
2.1 The Evolution in Managerial Accounting Practices 
The value-based management approach represents an extension of more than four 
decades of managerial accounting research and practice. According to the International 
Federation of Accountants ( 1998), the recent emphasis on value-based management is the 
fourth evolutionary step in managerial accounting. Prior to 1950, the primary focus of 
managerial accounting practice was cost determination and financial control, through the 
use of budgeting and cost accounting systems. By the mid-1960s, this focus shifted to 
the provision of information for management planning and control. This second stage 
was epitomized by Anthony's (1965) management control framework. Anthony 
described management control as the process for ensuring that resources are obtained and 
used effectively and efficiently to achieve the organization's objectives. His framework 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, see Dixon and Hedley (1997), Copeland et al. ( 1996); KPMG Consulting (1999), 
and Black et al. (1998), resp ectively . 
clearly distinguished management control from strategic planning and operational 
control, thereby limiting the scope of managerial accounting responsibilities and focusing 
primary attention on accounting information (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Otley, 1999). 
Contingency theories expanded the management planning and control framework by 
articulating some of the contextual or "contingent" factors influencing the entire 
organizational control "package" of accounting and non-accounting information systems, 
organizational design, and other control mechanisms (e.g., Gordon and Miller, 1976; 
Hayes, 1977; Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978; Otley, 1980). These theories contend that 
there is no universally applicable system of management accounting and control--the 
choice of appropriate accounting and control techniques depends upon the circumstances 
surrounding an organization. Among the prominent contingent factors in this literature 
are the external environment (e.g., simple vs. complex; static vs. dynamic), technology 
(e.g., job shop to mass production; production interdependencies; automation), 
competitive strategy and mission (e.g., low cost vs. innovation), business unit and 
industry characteristics (e.g., size, diversification, firm structure, regulation), and 
knowledge and observability factors (e.g., knowledge of the transformation process; 
outcome observability; behav ior observability) (Fisher, 1995). 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, managerial accounting began shifting away from a strict 
focus on planning and control to emphasize the reduction of waste in business processes. 
This shift was prompted by the growing adoption of quality management programs, as 
well as the introduction of accounting techniques such as cost of quality measurement, 
activity-based costing, process value analysis, and strategic cost management (e.g., 
Cooper and Kaplan, 1991; Shank and Govindarajan, 1994). 
By the mid-1990s, managerial accounting entered its fourth stage, with the focus on 
planning and control and waste reduction expanding to encompass a more strategic 
emphasis on the creation of firm value through the identification, measurement, and 
management of the drivers of customer value, organizational innovation, and shareholder 
returns. A hallmark of this era is the introduction of a diverse set of "new" managerial 
accounting techniques focused on promoting value creation. These techniques include 
the development of balanced scorecards of leading and lagging indicators of economic 
success (e.g., Kaplan and Norton, 19%), economic value measures that are claimed to 
approximate shareholder returns (e.g., Stewart, 1991), and strategic management 
accounting systems that provide information concerning the current and expected states 
of strategic uncertainties (e.g., Bromwich, 1990; Simons, 1991). 
2.2 The Value-Based Management Framework 
The value-based management approach builds on the preceding practices to provide 
an integrated framework for measuring and managing businesses, with the explicit 
objective of creating superior long-term value for shareholders (Dixon and Hedley, 1993; 
Copeland et al., 1996; KPMG Consulting, 1999; Black et al. , 1998). Although VBM 
frameworks vary somewhat from firm to firm, they generally include six basic steps. As 
shown in Figure 1, these steps include: 
1. Choosing specific internal objectives that lead to shareholder value enhancement. 
2. Selecting strategies and organizational designs consistent with the achievement of the 
chosen objectives. 
3. Identifying the specific performance v ariables, or ' 'value drivers," that actually create 
value in the business given the organization' s strategies and organizational design. 
4. Developing action plans, selecting performance measures, and setting targets based 
on the priorities identified in the value driver analysis. 
5. Evaluating the success of action plans and conducting organizational and managerial 
performance evaluations. 
6. Assessing the ongoing validity of the organization's internal objectives, strategies, 
plans, and control systems in light of current results, and modifying them as required. 
*** Figure 1 about here *** 
The simple sequential VBM framework (like all organizational design frameworks) is 
an abstraction of the complex interdependencies, simultaneous choices, and feedback 
loops found in practice. However, it prov ides a useful mechanism for categorizing 
empirical studies in managerial accounting (which typically assume a similar sequential 
process) and for assessing the extent to which this research supports the associations 
discussed in the normative VBM literature. More importantly, the framework captures 
many of the linkages highlighted in contingency theories, principal-agent models (see 
Baiman [1990] and Lambert [this issue] for reviews), and economics-based 
organizational design frameworks (e.g., Brickley et al., 1997a; Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992; Jensen, 1998). Figures 2 and 3, for example, illustrate representative economic and 
contingency frameworks developed by Brickley et al. (1995) and Otley (1980), 
respectively. Although the specific terminology and placement of variables vary 
somewhat, each framework suggests that managerial accounting and control should be 
viewed as a complete organizational control package consisting of accounting 
information systems, performance measurement and reward systems, and organizational 
design, with the choice and performance consequences of these practices a function of the 
firm 's external environment, organizational objectives, and strategies. The VBM 
framework extends these ideas to highlight the identification of the firm 's financial and 
non-financial value drivers, and the feedback loop from performance to the subsequent 
reassessment of objectives, strategies, and organizational design and control. 
*** Figures 2 and 3 about here *** 
3. General Observations on Empirical Research in Managerial Accounting 
In reviewing the studies for this paper, a number of notable features struck our 
attention, including the practice-oriented nature of this research, the extent to which the 
studies' topics correspond to the latest management fads, and the diversity in samples, 
research methods, and theories used by researchers. 
Perhaps the most striking feature is the extent to which the research is driven by 
changes in practice (albeit with some lag). The focus on emerging trends offers 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, it produces a diverse set of interesting 
papers that are better aligned with the interests of practitioners and the material covered 
in most contemporary managerial accounting textbooks. In our view, this alignment is 
desirable, and has helped overcome some of the criticisms in the 1980s and early 1990s 
that managerial accounting research had become irrelev ant and no longer reflected the 
concerns of managers. 
On the other hand, it has produced a faddish nature to the managerial accounting 
literature. Many papers are motivated purely by the fact that a certain topic has received 
considerable attention in the business press, with little effort to place the practice or study 
within some broader theoretical context. An example is early cost driver studies, which 
were motivated by claims in practitioner-oriented activity-based costing and operations 
management articles, rather than economic, operations research, or behavioral theories 
(see Dopuch [ 1993] for a critique of cost driver studies). 
Research topics also tend to disappear as the next big managerial accounting 
"innovation" appears, even though earlier "hot" topics may not have been fully explored. 
An excellent example is research at the interface of accounting and operations 
management. Beginning with Kaplan's (1983) call for greater emphasis on 
manufacturing performance measurement, considerable enthusiasm for research on this 
topic emerged in the managerial accounting community. Two research conferences 
sponsored by Harvard Business School resulted in widely cited books containing papers 
by leading researchers from North America and Europe (Bruns and Kaplan, 1987; 
Kaplan, 1990). Journals such as Accounting, Organizations and Society, The A ccounting 
Review, Journal of A ccounting and Economics, and Journal of Accounting Research 
published papers on manufacturing performance measurement, incentives in advanced 
manufacturing environments, and production economics. Yet, despite the initial 
enthusiasm, the advent of "new" topics such as the balanced scorecard, intangible assets, 
and economic v alue added has substantially reduced research at the interface of 
accounting and operations management. 2 Instead, we are left with an underdeveloped 
body of research that fails to build on prior studies to increase our understanding of the 
2 Brickley et al. (1997b) document a similar pattern of interest in ' 'innovative" management techniques in 
the business press. For example, interest in just-in-time manufacturing peaked in the late 1980s, while 
interest in total quality management began to wane in the early 1990s. In their place, press coverage began 
emphasizing activity-based costing and reengineering. By 1997, interest in these two topics also began to 
decline, this time in favor of articles on economic value added. The declining interest in advanced 
manufacturing practices in the business press is likely to explain much of the topic's declining interest in 
the managerial accounting community. Another factor may be greater access to funding and research sites 
when research topics are perceived to be new or innovative. 
topic, leaves many important research topics unexplored3, and lacks the critical mass of 
related studies needed to reconcile conflicting results or to reach consensus on the 
performance benefits from various manufacturing performance measurement practices.4 
One factor making it difficult to generalize results from managerial accounting 
studies is the diversity in samples, research methods, and theories used by researchers. 
This div ersity has a number of causes. One of the primary causes is differences in the 
theoretical disciplines used to motivate managerial accounting studies. Unlike capital 
markets research, which is based almost exclusively on financial economics theories, 
managerial accounting research draws from a wide variety of disciplines, including 
economics, psychology, sociology, and operations research.5 This variety is due in part 
to the fact that much of the empirical research in managerial accounting is conducted 
outside of North America. While North American universities tend to emphasize 
economics in their doctoral programs and research, many universities in other parts of the 
world place greater emphasis on behavioral disciplines such as organizational behavior 
and sociology . This behav ioral focus is reflected in our citations, with significantly more 
references from the behav iorally-oriented European journal Accounting, Organizations, 
and Society than from leading economics-oriented North American journals. 
Another factor contributing to the diversity in managerial accounting research is the 
lack of publicly-available data. Whereas financial accounting and executive 
3 Young and Selto's (1991) review of the advanced manufacturing literature identified a variety of research 
topics for accounting researchers. A number of these, such as cost of quality measurement and life cycle 
costing, have received virtually no attention in leading accounting j ournals. 
4 Perhaps the only managerial accounting topics that have received enough attention to perform true meta-
analyses of results are executive compensation and participative budgeting, neither of which is covered in 
any detail in this review. See Greenberg et al. (1994) for a meta-analysis of the participative budgeting 
literature. 
5 See Shields ( 1997) for an analysis of the theoretical bases used in managerial accounting research during 
the 1990s. 
compensation researchers can obtain data from financial statements, firm disclosures, and 
data bases such as Compustat, CRSP, Execucomp, and I/B/E/S, public information on 
managerial accounting practices or adoption dates is rarely available. Instead, 
researchers must conduct surveys usmg instruments that tend to vary somewhat from 
study to study, obtain data from third parties such as consulting firms, or gather 
company-specific archival data from research sites. The broad set of data sources allows 
managerial accounting studies to avoid the narrow focus that sometimes occurs when 
researchers are constrained by the availability of public data (e.g., the over-emphasis on 
executives in compensation studies due to proxy disclosure requirements). However, the 
heterogeneity in samples makes it difficult to compare findings, build on prior studies, or 
assess the generalizability of the results. 
We conduct our review against this background. In the following sections, we 
attempt to categorize and summarize the diverse set of managerial accounting studies. 
We follow this appraisal with our views on the steps required to advance empirical 
research in managerial accounting as we go forward. 
4. Review of Empirical Research 
Our rev iew is organized using the six value-based management steps in Figure 1. For 
each step in the framework, we critically evaluate related empirical studies, identify 
common limitations, and offer suggestions for future research. 
4.1 The Choice ofOrganizational Objectives 
A primary assumption in managerial accounting research is that the ultimate goal of 
managerial accounting systems is prov iding the information and control mechanisms 
needed to achieve organizational objectives. However, the choice of specific 
organizational objectives traditionally has been outside the scope of managerial 
accounting research. This has changed with the advent of value-based management 
approaches. In this section, we discuss these changes and assess research on the choice 
of objectives in value-based management programs. We then prov ide a broader 
perspective on research opportunities related to the choice and performance consequences 
of organizational objectives. 
4.1.1 Research on Value-Based Organizational Objectives 
Many VBM advocates contend that an organization's primary objectives must be 
stated in terms of "economic value" measures, such as economic value added (EVA) and 
cash flow return on investment (CFROI), in order to align internal goals with the 
maximization of shareholder value (e.g., Copeland et al., 1996; Stem et al. 1995; KPMG 
Consulting, 1999). 6 This contention is based on assertions that changes in economic 
value measures track changes in shareholder wealth more closely than traditional 
accounting measures, and should therefore replace accounting measures for goal setting, 
capital budgeting, and compensation purposes (Stern et al., 1995). Claims that economic 
value measures are superior to traditional accounting measures are not limited to 
consultants and the business press. Analytical studies by Anctil (1996), Rogerson (1997), 
6 The foundations for these "new" economic value measures are residual income and internal rate of return 
concepts developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Stem Stewart & Co.'s trademarked "Economic Value Added" 
or EVA® measure, for example, is the firm' s proprietary adaptation of residual income. EVA is defined as 
adjusted operating income minus a capital charge. Common adjustments to compute EVA include 
modifications to the deferred income tax reserve, the LIFO reserve, the treatment of intangible assets such 
as research and development and advertising, and goodwill amortization. CFROI is similar to the long-
term internal rate of return, calculated by dividing inflation-adjusted cash flow by the inflation-adjusted 
cash investment. 
Reichelstein ( 1997), and others show how the use of residual income-based measures 
such as EVA can ensure goal congruence between the principal and agent. 7 
Much of the support for the claimed superiority of economic value measures is based 
on relatively unsophisticated studies examining the relation between market measures 
(e.g., market value or shareholder returns) and EVA. Simple univariate tests by 
Milunovich and Tseui ( 1996) and Lehn and Makhija ( 1997) find market-value added 
more highly associated with EVA than with accounting returns, earnings per share, 
earnings per share growth, return on equity, free cash flow, or free cash growth. O'Byrne 
(1996) uses regression models to examine the association between market value and two 
performance measures: EVA and net operating profit after tax (NOPAT). Both measures 
have similar explanatory power when no control variables are included in the regression 
models, but a modified EVA model has greater explanatory power when industry 
indicator variables and the logarithm of capital for each firm are included as additional 
explanatory variables. Howev er, O 'Byrne (1996) does not make similar adjustments to 
the NOPAT model, making it impossible to compare results using the different measures. 
More sophisticated analyses are less conclusive. Chen and Dodd ( 1997) examine the 
explanatory power of accounting measures (earnings per share, return on assets, and 
return on equity), residual income, and various EVA-related measures. Although the 
EVA measures outperform accounting earnings in explaining stock returns, the earnings 
measures provide significant incremental explanatory power above EVA. The authors 
also find the explanatory power of the EVA measures far lower than claimed by 
proponents. 
7 See Bromwich and Walker (1 998) for a review of theoretical papers on the strengths and weaknesses of 
value-based management approaches based on residual income measures such as EVA. 
Biddle et al. (1997) use contemporary capital markets research techniques to examine 
the power of accounting measures (earnings and operating profits) to explain stock 
market returns relative to EVA and five components of EVA (cash flow from operations, 
operating accruals, after-tax interest expense, capital charge, and accounting 
adjustments). In contrast to less sophisticated studies, Biddle et al. ( 1997) find that 
traditional accounting measures generally outperform EVA in explaining stock prices. 
While the EVA measure's capital charges and adjustments for accounting "distortions" 
have some incremental explanatory power over traditional accounting measures, the 
contribution from these variables is not economically significant in their tests. 
Even if economic v alue measures have a stronger statistical relation with stock 
returns, it is not clear that these measures are preferable for management planning and 
control purposes. Analytical research by Gjesdal (1981) and Paul (1992) shows that an 
information system that is useful for valuing the firm need not be useful in assessing a 
manager's performance, making the correlation between a performance measure and 
stock returns irrelevant when choosing objectives. Similarly, Zimmerman (1997) 
discusses how divisional EVA measures may be highly misleading indicators of value 
creation and may provide the wrong incentives, even if corporate EVA closely tracks 
changes in stock price. Garvey and Milbourn (2000), on the other hand, dev elop a model 
showing that the correlation between EVA and stock returns is a relevant factor in the 
choice of performance measures. They empirically test this model by examining whether 
the adoption of EVA for compensation purposes is positively related to the statistical 
association between the fum's economic value added and stock returns. Their results 
support this hypothesis, leading the authors to conclude that the correlation between 
performance measures and stock returns is a useful input into the choice of internal 
objectiv es. 
The mixed results in these studies raise an important question: Do organizations 
using economic value measures as their primary objectives for planning and control 
purposes achieve superior performance? Again, the evidence is mixed. Wallace ( 1997) 
examines relative performance changes in 40 adopters of residual income-based 
compensation measures such as EVA and a matched sample of non-users. Compared to the 
control fnms, residual income fnms decrease new inv estments, increase payouts to 
shareholders through share repurchases, and utilize assets more intensively, leading to 
significantly greater change in residual income. Wallace (1997) also finds weak evidence 
that stock market participants respond favorably to the adoption of residual income-based 
compensation plans. 
Wallace's (1997) study examines changes in performance rather than performance 
levels, and only examines performance changes over one year. Hogan and Lewis (1999) 
extend his study by investigating performance changes over a four year period, and by 
matching control firms on past performance to control for possible mean reversion in 
performance levels. They find that adopters of residual income measures are relatively poor 
performers prior to the compensation plans ' implementation, and that the improved stock 
returns and operating performance reported by Wallace (1997) may not be unique to 
economic value adopters. After introducing past profitability as an additional matching 
criteria, they fmd no significant difference in the stock price or operating performance of 
their two groups, and conclude that economic value plans are no better in their ability to 
create shareholder wealth than traditional plans blending earnings-based bonuses and stock-
based compensation. 
4.1.2 Limitations and Research Opportunities 
Perhaps the biggest limitation in the preceding studies is the use of publicly 
available data on EVA values and uses. Studies of EVA's predictive ability typically 
employ published EVA data estimated by the consulting firm Stem Stewart. However, 
these numbers are computed using public financial data, and contain relatively few of the 
accounting adjustments EVA proponents encourage companies to make to more closely 
approximate "economic profits." 8 This may understate the value of the measures since 
the published figures exclude the detailed firm-specific adjustments Stem Stewart and 
other consultants perform for their clients (Garvey and Milbourn, 2000). It also is 
unclear whether the estimated EVA figures are even appropriate for firms that have not 
implemented EVA systems. 
A second limitation from the use of public data is the primary focus on EVA-
based compensation for executives, rather than other uses such as capital budgeting or 
lower-level compensation that may be harder to identify from public sources. Although 
Stern et al. ( 1995) argue that effective implementation ofEV A requires firms to make this 
measure the cornerstone of a total management system that focuses on EVA for capital 
budgeting, goal setting, investor communication, and compensation, surveys suggest that 
the majority ofEVA and VBM adopters continue to place heavy emphasis on traditional 
accounting objectives for various purposes (KPMG Consulting, 1999). Furthermore, the 
8 Stern Stewart recommends up to 160 adjustments that firms can make to more closely approximate 
"economic profits." Common adjustments include modifications to the deferred income tax reserve, the 
LIFO reserve, the treatment of intangible assets such as research and development and advertising, and 
goodwill amortization (see Stewart [1991, 113-117] for other recommended adjustments). Stern Stewart's 
majority of firms adopting economic value measures do not use the measures in incentive 
plans (Ittner and Larcker, 1998a), suggesting that studies focused on EVA-based 
compensation plans identify only a small fraction ofEV A users. 
Research to date has also emphasized the value relevance of EVA or other 
residual income-based economic value measures, despite surveys finding substantial use 
of cashflow-based measures such as CFROI in value-based management programs 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 1999). Considerable debate exists over the relative ability of 
different economic value measures (EVA, CFROI, or variants of these measures) to 
predict stock returns, with many consulting firms claiming that their economic value 
measures are far better indicators of value creation than EVA (Myers, 1996; The 
Economist, 1996). Researchers can examine the circumstances under which the 
alternative value-based measures are more predictive of stock returns than EVA or 
traditional accounting measures, and the potential factors (e.g., competitive environment, 
environmental uncertainty, and product or industry life cycle) explaining any cross-
sectional differences in predictiv e ability. 
A final issue is whether shareholder wealth maximization should drive the choice 
of internal objectives. Many firms believe that a broader "stakeholder" approach to 
organizational objectives is preferred to a single-minded focus on shareholders. 9 The 
VBM adopters surveyed by KPMG Consulting ( 1999) rated customers their most 
important stakeholders (with shareholders second and employees third), and customer 
publicly available database makes an unspecified "handful" of standard adjustments, and excludes film-
specific adjustments made for its clients. 
9 The adoption of a stakeholder approach need not be inconsistent with shareholder wealth creation. 
Berman et al. (1999), for example, argue that concern for multiple stakeholders (e.g., employees, 
customers, community, and the environment) may be motivated by the perception that this approach 
improves financial performance, rather than a moral commitment to the stakeholder groups. Their 
empirical tests provide some support for this proposition. 
satisfaction their second most important corporate goal (behind profits but ahead of stock 
returns and economic value measures). Despite these differing perspectives, relatively 
little is known about the effects of different objectiv es on strategic choices, 
organizational design, and firm performance. Thus, an important question is whether the 
choice of internal objectiv es actually influences corporate success. 10 
4.2 Strategy Development and Organizational Design Choices 
Proponents of value-based management contend that the second step in the VBM 
process is selecting specific strategies and organizational designs to achieve the chosen 
objectives . This step is consistent with many economics-based organizational design 
frameworks and analytical models. Brickley et al. 's (1995) framework, for example, 
suggests that a firm ' s "organizational architecture," including the assignment of decision-
rights to employees, is directly influenced by the firm ' s fmancial and non-financial goals 
and business strategy (see Figure 2). Similarly, Milgram and Roberts (1995) model the 
benefits from greater ''fit" between the firm 's strategy, organizational structure, and 
management processes. 
This section begins by rev iewing empirical studies on the relations among managerial 
accounting practices, firm strategy, and operational strategies . Because this topic has 
been comprehensively reviewed in earlier papers (e.g., Dent, 1990; Langfield-Smith, 
1997), we focus much of our attention on the measurement of strategy in empirical 
studies. We then examine research on organizational design, an issue that has received 
10 A related issue is the applicability of the value-based management framework in private and non-profit 
organizations, which do not have shareholder value enhancement as an organizational objective. Despite 
this difference in objectives, many non-profit organizations follow a similar planning and control process 
more attention in analytical studies of managerial accounting practices than in empirical 
studies. Using survey evidence from :fmancial services firms, we highlight some of the 
limitations in these studies and suggest potential av enues for future research. 
4.2. 1 Strategy and M anagerial Accounting Research 
As with the choice of organizational objectiv es, the managerial accounting literature 
generally takes strategy as giv en and examines the association betw een strategic choices 
and the organization's accounting and control system design. These studies typically 
measure strategy as a continuum between firms following a "defender," "harvest," or 
"cost leadership" strategy and firms following a "prospector," "build," or "innovation" 
strategy (Dent, 1990; Langfield-Smith, 1997). As defined in the strategy literature, a 
"defender," ''harvest," or "cost leadership" strategy focuses on being the low cost 
producer of a narrow product range, while a "prospector," "build," or " innov ation" 
strategy focuses on being first-to-market with a variety of innov ative products or services 
(e .g., l\1iles and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1985). Although a useful indicator of organizational 
strategy, this simple continuum misses the multi-dimensional nature of strategic choices. 
Strategy researchers, for example, argue that viable strategies other than strict cost 
leadership or innovation ex ist, such as providing higher quality than competitors, 
differentiating products through image, superior customer service, or focus on a 
particular market niche, or being more flexible in responding to customer demands or 
copying competitors' innovations (Miles and Snow, 1978; Porter, 1985). 
A related measure that is widely used in accounting research is "perceiv ed 
environmental uncertainty" (or PEU). The managerial accounting literature defines 
(e.g. , General Accounting Office, 1998). Thus, an interesting research issue is the benefits of this general 
approach in publicly-traded companies relative to private or non-profit organizations. 
environmental uncertainty as ( 1) lack of information regarding the environmental factors 
affecting a given decision-making situation, (2) not knowing how much the organization 
will lose if a specific decision is incorrect, and (3) the difficulty in assigning probabilities 
with any degree of certainty as to how env ironmental factors are going to affect the 
success or failure of a decision (Fisher, 1995). Research suggests that competitive 
strategy and environmental uncertainty are related, with more innovative "prospector" 
firms facing greater uncertainty than firms following a cost leader or "defender" strategy 
(Fisher, 1995). However, using perceived environmental uncertainty as a strategy proxy 
is problematic. First, environmental uncertainty is likely to be influenced by many 
factors other than strategy, including such exogenous factors as market competition, 
technological changes, and political conditions. Second, using managers' percep tions of 
environmental uncertainty rather than objective measures of env ironmental conditions 
makes it difficult to discern which factors the managers considered when responding. 
Other common proxies for strategy are publicly-disclosed information on research 
and dev elopment expenditures and market-to-book ratios, which are assumed to reflect 
the rrrm' s "growth opportunities" or the extent to which the firm follows an innovation 
strategy . Howev er, measures such as these are likely to be noisy proxies for growth 
opportunities or strategic choices. Market-to-book ratios, for example, tend to v ary by 
industry. Consequently, this measure may simply be picking up industry effects in large 
cross-sectional studies, with little ability to distinguish strategy differences within an 
industry. Similarly, many firms do not report research and development expenditures, 
even though they may still be innov ative along dimensions that are not captured in 
research and development expenditures (e.g., product and process flexibility, distribution, 
information technology, etc.). 
Although the primary focus in managerial accounting studies is corporate or 
business unit strategy, other studies examine lower-level operational strategies such as 
just-in-time production, flexible manufacturing systems, and total quality management 
(e.g., Daniel and Reitsperger, 1991; Banker et al., 1993; Young and Selto, 1993; 
Abernethy and Lillis, 1995; Ittner and Larcker, 1995, 1997; Perera et al., 1997; Sim and 
Killough, 1998; Scott and Tiessen, 1999). These studies typically ignore the higher-level 
strategic choices made by the firm, even though all of these choices are expected to 
influence accounting and control system design and organizational performance. Most of 
these studies also examine only one operational strategy at a time, despite evidence that 
many companies simultaneously adopt multiple operational strategies (e.g., just-in-time 
production in conjunction with total quality management). 11 
4.2.2 Organizational Design in Managerial A ccounting Research 
In contrast to the large body of analytical research on the optimal choice of 
organizational design (e.g., Melumad et al., 1992; Baiman et al. , 1995), relatively few 
empirical studies examine the determinants of organizational design. Instead, empirical 
studies often assume that some relation exists between organizational design choices 
(e.g., decentralization, allocation of decision rights, or interdependencies) and strategy (or 
perceived environmental uncertainty), and examine their interactive effect on control 
11 An exception is Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998), who use cluster analysis to examine the effects of 
"bundles" of organizational prnctices (i.e., higher-level strategies, operntional strategies, and management 
accounting techniques) on perceived performance. One limitation of this approach is the inability to 
determine whether all of the practices used by high performing organizations are necessary, or whether 
some of the practices provide greater performance benefits than others. 
system design or performance.12 An exception is Vancil' s (1978) early work on 
decentralization. Using simple univariate statistical methods, Vancil finds diversification 
strategies positively associated with the number of functions performed by a profit center 
and the degree to which profit center managers have control over the assigned costs of 
centralized operations. 
More recent studies investigate the factors influencing the design of production 
activ ities. Economic theories contend that successful adoption of advanced 
manufacturing strategies requires simultaneous changes in organizational design and 
managerial processes (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Wruck and Jensen, 1994). 
Abernethy and Lillis (1995) examine these claims by testing the relation between the 
adoption of flexible manufacturing systems and integrative liaison devices such as teams, 
meetings, and task forces. Their simple correlation analyses indicate that the extent to 
which organizations adopt a flexible manufacturing strategy is positively associated with 
the use of these integrative devices. In contrast, Selto et al. (1995) report that production 
worker authority in a manufacturing plant that adopted just-in-time production is not 
statistically associated with task difficulty or variability or with the job's dependency on 
workgroup involvement. However, the extent to which work is standardized is 
negatively associated with task difficulty or v ariability and positively associated with the 
job's dependency on the workgroup. Scott and Tiessen's (1999) results are also mixed, 
with the proportion of time spent in inter-departmental teams increasing with 
manufacturing task complexity, but having no relation with the number of organizational 
12 For examples of accmmting studies using organizational design characteristics as independent variables, 
see Bruns and Waterhouse ( 1975), Hayes (1977); Larcker (1981 ), Scapen and Sale ( 1985), Chenhall and 
Morris (1986), Govindarajan and Fisher (1990); Mia and Chenhall (1994), Chong (1996); Buslunan et al. 
(1996), and Keating (1997). 
levels in the plant or the extent of reciprocal relations among departments. Time spent in 
intra-departmental teams, on the other hand, increases with more extensive reciprocal 
relations, but falls with greater task complexity. Thus, the relation between 
organizational design practices and manufacturing strategies remains unclear. 
4.2.3 Limitations and Research Opportunities 
One of the keys to improving research in this area is improving the measurement 
of strategy . As discussed above, most studies measure this construct using a simple 
continuum between firms following a cost leadership strategy and those following an 
innovation or growth-oriented strategy. Given the multidimensional nature of corporate 
strategy, a single measure is unlikely to capture many relevant strategic distinctions (e.g., 
innovative companies pursuing a niche or differentiation strategy versus those pursuing a 
mass market strategy). Table 1 illustrates this problem using survey data we collected 
from 148 financial service firms .13 We asked senior executives from these firms to 
evaluate 12 aspects of the company's organizational strategy and corporate environment 
that are commonly used to measure strategy and perceived environmental uncertainty. 
Principal components analysis (with oblique rotation) reveals three factors with 
eigenvalues greater than one.14 The factors capture the extent to which the firm's 
strategy focuses on innovation (denoted INNOV), flexibility in changing its product and 
service offerings and responding to market demands (denoted FLEX), and the pursuit of 
existing customers and markets in predictable environments (denoted PREDICT). One 
question asking whether the firm is more cost efficient than its competitors did not load 
13 The survey data on financial service firms were jointly collected by the authors and the Cap Gemini Ernst 
& Young Center for Business Innovation. 
14 Specific questions and their assignment to the three strategy constructs are provided in Table 1. 
greater than 0.40 on any of the factors , even though this characteristic is generally 
assumed to be a key strategic attribute. This question is dropped from the analysis. 
*** Table 1 about here*** 
Table 1 prov ides correlations among the three resulting constructs and the firm's 
book-to-market ratio (denoted BTOM, a commonly used inverse measure of growth 
opportunities). The correlations suggest that some of the strategic dimensions are not 
independent. In particular, flexibility (FLEX) and product and service innovation 
(INNOV) have a strong, positive correlation (two-tailed p < 0.001). Innovation and 
market stability (PREDICT) also have a marginally significant positive correlation 
(Pearson correlation= 0.14, two-tailed p = 0.09), not the negative association often 
assumed in accounting research. In contrast, the book-to-market ratio is not significantly 
correlated with any of the survey-based strategy proxies. Although the insignificant 
associations with BTOM are due in part to the computation of book-to-market ratios in 
fmancial service firms (where investments in securities are marked-to-market), this 
evidence indicates that publicly available strategy proxies such as BTOM may not be 
appropriate in all settings. Taken together, the principal components analysis and 
correlations highlight the need to incorporate constructs that capture multiple strategic 
dimensions, and to examine their individual and joint effects on managerial accounting 
practices and firm performance. 
Future studies can also examine whether objectives, strategies, and organizational 
designs are simultaneously determined. Some economic theories suggest that these 
choices should be made jointly (Brickley et al., 1997a; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995), 
rather than sequentially as shown in the VBM framework. Most studies, on the other 
hand, treat one or more of these decisions as exogenous, independent variables in their 
empirical specifications. The typical approach is to assume a causal relation running 
from strategy or organizational design to the design of managerial accounting and control 
systems. However, the direction of causality may actually be opposite, with accounting 
system design promoting or inhibiting the adoption of certain strategies (e.g., Dent, 1990; 
Langfield-Smith, 1997). Additional research using simultaneous equations methods can 
shed light on the actual direction of causality among these choices. 
One important issue that has received almost no attention in empirical studies is 
the effect of organizational objectives on the choice of strategies and organizational 
design. VBM frameworks suggest that the choice of internal objectives should determine 
the strategies and organizational designs adopted to achieve these objectives. Case study 
research provides some support for this assertion. Studies by Baker and Wruck ( 1989) 
and Wruck ( 1994) describe how increased leverage led their two case study sites to 
modify internal objectives, decentralize decision-making, and reorganize manufacturing 
processes. Similarly, Dial and Murphy (1995) discuss how the adoption of an explicit 
corporate objective of increasing shareholder value led to changes in corporate strategy 
and organization. Large-sample studies can extend these studies by examining the extent 
to which changes in organizational objectives affect companies ' strategies and 
organizational designs. 
Finally, more research is needed on the determinants of organizational design 
choices. Managerial accounting theory suggests that these choices are critical 
components of the management control package (e.g., Melumad et al., 1992; Baiman et 
al., 1995; Brickley et al., 1997a). Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the 
factors influencing organizational design. Where these studies have been conducted, they 
have been limited to a very small subset of the organizational choices made by the firm. 
Empirical studies can extend this literature by testing the hypotheses generated by 
managerial accounting theories, and determining whether the broad set of organizational 
design choices are complements or substitutes for other management control practices. 
4.3 Identification of Value Drivers 
Agency models indicate that the goal of control systems is promoting congruence 
between the actions taken by the agent and the actions desired by the principal. If the 
principal's ultimate objective is maximizing shareholder value, these models suggest that 
control systems should emphasize those actions that are expected to increase shareholder 
returns. The value-based management process goes a step further by focusing on the 
identification of the financial and operational ''value drivers" that lead to increased 
shareholder value. Identification of these drivers and their interrelations is expected to 
improve resource allocation, performance measurement, and the design of information 
systems by identifying the specific actions or factors that cause costs to arise or revenues 
to change. This section reviews three managerial accounting research streams that focus 
on the identification and measurement ofvalue drivers: (1) activity-based costing (ABC), 
(2) strategic cost management, and (3) the balanced scorecard. 
4. 3. I Activity-Based Costing 
Activity-based costing studies emphasize the ability of non-volume related measures 
to predict overhead usage (Cooper and Kaplan, 1991). In doing so, this literature focuses 
on how improved understanding of cost drivers can improve the allocation of overhead 
and thereby improve decision-making. The ABC literature also highlights the role 
increased understanding of cost driv ers can play in reducing "non-v alue-added" activities 
that reduce efficiency while adding little or no v alue to the customer (also known as 
activ ity-based management). 
Most value driver research to date has tested the ABC literature's claims that cost 
drivers other than volume explain a significant proportion of ov erhead costs. Contrary to 
these claims, Foster and Gupta's (1990) cross-sectional analysis of data from 37 
manufacturing plants owned by one firm provides little ev idence that complexity or 
efficiency-related variables explain overhead costs. In contrast, Banker et al. 's ( 1995) 
cross-sectional study of 31 plants in three industries finds complexity v ariables 
significantly associated with overhead costs, even after controlling for direct labor costs 
(a proxy for v olume). Banker and Johnston's (1993) cross-sectional analysis of the 
airline industry yields similar results. Several longitudinal studies find significant 
positive relations between overhead costs and non-volume cost drivers (Anderson, 1995; 
Platt, 1996; Ittner et al. , 1997; Fisher and Ittner, 1999), but the incremental explanatory 
power from the non-volume measures generally is quite small. 
Research has also examined other assumptions underlying the ABC concept. Noreen 
and Soderstrom (1994) and Maher and Marais (1998) use data from hospitals to examine 
whether overhead costs are proportional to activ ity . Their results suggest that ABC 
systems that assume costs are strictly proportional to their drivers grossly overstate 
relevant costs for decision-making and performance evaluation purposes. However, the 
importance of this finding is unclear. Most managerial accounting textbooks discuss the 
concept of the "relevant range." This concept maintains that cost functions are non-
linear, but that linear assumptions can still be appropriate within a relatively narrow range 
of potential production or activity volumes. Thus, the extent to which the linear 
assumptions embedded in ABC and other costing system harm decision-making remains 
an open 1ssue. 
MacArthur and Stranahan ( 1998) also use hospital data to investigate whether the 
level of hospital complexity is simultaneously determined with the level of overhead 
costs needed to support this complexity. Unlike most studies that assume complexity is 
an exogenous determinant of overhead, MacArthur and Stranahan's (1998) analyses 
indicate that these choices are jointly determined. In a similar vein, Datar et al. ( 1993) 
examine interdependencies among cost drivers, which ABC approaches typically ignore. 
Analysis of product-level data from one plant indicates that supervision, maintenance, 
and scrap costs are simultaneously determined, leading the researchers to conclude that 
failure to recognize this simultaneity results in inaccurate estimates of cost driver effects. 
Ittner et al. (1997) investigate the descriptive validity and performance consequences 
of Cooper and Kaplan's (1991) "overhead cost hierarchy." Principal components 
analysis of a wide variety of manufacturing measures indicates that these measures 
generally corresponded to the unit, batch, and product-sustaining categories proposed in 
Cooper and Kaplan's (1991) cost hierarchy. However, activities related to the various 
cost hierarchy levels are not independent, consistent with Datar et al. 's ( 1993) conclusion 
that choices among cost drivers can be interdependent. In addition, any cost increases 
from increased unit and product-sustaining activities tend to be offset by revenue 
increases from higher sales volumes and greater product v ariety at their research site, 
indicating that cost driv ers should not be examined in isolation from their revenue effects. 
4.2.2 Strategic Cost Management and the Balanced Scorecard 
The strategic cost management literature extends the ABC concept by focusing not 
only on the structural driv ers of overhead costs (such as the organization' s scale and 
scope, the level and type of technology, and product variety strategy), but also on 
executional cost driv ers that hinge on the organization' s ability to "execute" its 
operations efficiently and effectively (Porter, 1985; Riley, 1987; Shank and 
Gov indarajan, 1994; Shields and Young, 1995). Key executional cost drivers in this 
literature include practices such as work force involvement, customer and supplier 
relations, the extent of total quality management activ ities, plant layout, and product and 
process design. 
The balanced scorecard concept moves beyond the analysis of cost drivers to 
emphasize the measurement of performance along multiple dimensions of "value 
drivers," including financial performance, customer relations, internal business processes, 
and learning and innovation, that are linked in a causal "business model" of leading and 
lagging performance drivers and outcomes (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Kaplan and 
Norton (1996) contend that an integrated balanced scorecard allows managers to better 
understand the relations among v arious strategic objectives, to communicate the 
association between employees ' actions and the chosen strategic goals, and to allocate 
resources and set priorities based on the initiatives ' contributions to long-term strategic 
objectives. 
Studies within these research streams typically examine claims that non-financial 
measures are " leading" indicators or drivers of future financial performance. Many of 
these studies investigate the relation between customer satisfaction measures and 
subsequent accounting or stock returns, with mixed results. Banker et al. (2000) and 
Behn and Riley ( 1999) find positive associations between customer satisfaction measures 
and future accounting performance in the hotel and airline industries, respectively. Ittner 
and Larcker's ( 1998b) investigation of customer, business unit, and firm-level data also 
supports claims that customer satisfaction measures are leading indicators of customer 
purchase behavior, accounting performance, and current market value. However, the 
relation between customer satisfaction and future performance is non-linear, with little 
performance effect at high satisfaction levels. In addition, their firm-level results vary by 
industry, with positive relations in some industries and negative or insignificant relations 
in others. Foster and Gupta's (1997) study of customer data from a wholesale beverage 
distributor also finds positive, negative, or insignificant results depending upon the 
questions included in the satisfaction measures or the model specification (levels or 
percentage changes). 
Surprisingly little research has been conducted on the balanced scorecard concept, 
despite considerable interest in the topic. What evidence that exists prov ides limited 
support for the scorecard's claimed benefits. A survey of Australian manufacturers by 
Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998) indicates that the average plant rated the benefits 
from "balanced performance measures" 3.81 on a scale ranging from 1 (no benefit) to 7 
(high benefit), with higher and lower performing plants reporting no consistent 
differences in the perceived benefits from balanced performance measures. The modest 
perceived benefits from balanced performance measures are supported by Ittner et al. 
(2001), who find that the implementation of a balanced scorecard compensation plan in a 
retail bank brought no significant change in branch managers' understanding of strategic 
goals or their connection to the managers' actions, and was associated with lower 
perceived adequacy of information on managers' progress towards business goals. 
4.2.3 Limitations and Research Opportunities Related to ABC and Cost Drivers 
Overal~ the cost driver analyses provide evidence that factors other than volume have 
a statistically significant relation with overhead, and tend to verify at least some of the 
key assumptions of ABC. However, this work has a number oflimitations. Many ofthe 
studies use direct labor costs as a proxy for production volume. Although consistent with 
the overhead allocation base used in many traditional cost accounting systems, including 
direct labor as an independent variable causes the effects of non-volume cost drivers to be 
understated if these drivers also impact direct labor requirements. Ittner and MacDuffie 
(1995) find that cost drivers such as product variety and automation affect manufacturing 
overhead not only directly, but also indirectly through increased direct labor requirements 
and the resulting need for higher supetvisory and administrative staffmg. Similarly, 
Dopuch and Gupta (1994) and Fisher and Ittner (1999) find significant associations 
between direct labor costs and non-volume cost drivers such as the number of production 
batches and product mix variability, even after controlling for production volumes. If 
researchers are to develop a deeper understanding of v alue drivers, both the direct and 
indirect effects of these drivers must be taken into account. 
Cost driver studies also contain little discussion of the contingency factors 
influencing the relative importance of different value drivers. Although an examination of 
individual cost driver studies in different industries suggests that factors such as 
technology, production process (e.g., batch to mass production), and scheduling practices 
affect the importance of various cost drivers, no study has explicitly investigated how 
these and other contingent factors moderate cost driver effects. 
Most prior studies also ignore executional cost drivers such as product 
manufacturability and work practices, even though these drivers may be harder to 
replicate and potentially more valuable for achieving competitive advantage (Porter, 
1985; Riley, 1987; Shank and Govindarajan, 1994). Ittner and MacDuffie (1995) find that 
differences in work systems (e.g., worker involvement, use of teams, and job rotation) 
rather than differences in structural cost drivers (e.g., product variety) explain much of 
the overhead labor advantage found in Japanese automobile assembly plants relative to 
their western competitors. These results suggest that greater understanding ofthe 
methods available to control costs will require researchers to examine both executional 
and structural cost drivers. 
One promising avenue for future research is exploring the influence of structural and 
executional cost drivers on the entire value chain. The strategic cost management 
literature argues that cost driver analyses should not be limited to the activities carried out 
within the firm, but should also incorporate linkages with suppliers and customers. 
Analyzing cost drivers throughout the value chain is essential for determining where in 
the value chain-from design to distribution-costs can be lowered or customer value 
enhanced (Hergert and Morris, 1989; Shank and Govindarajan, 1994). 
It will also be important to understand the interactions and tradeoffs among the 
various structural and executional cost drivers. With the exception ofDatar et al. (1993), 
prior studies treat the v arious cost drivers as independent. However, cost drivers 
frequently counteract or reinforce each other (Porter, 1985, p. 84). The presence of 
counteracting and reinforcing cost driv ers implies the need to optimize entire processes to 
generate lasting improv ements in cost position relative to competitors. Future research 
can attempt to identify and resolve these tradeoffs in different settings. 
Most importantly, studies need to determine whether improv ed understanding of cost 
drivers leads managers to make better decisions or improves organizational performance 
(Dopuch, 1993). Research on ABC success relies almost exclusively on perceptual 
outcome measures, such as the extent of ABC system usage or the perceived benefits 
from adoption. 15 In general, these studies report moderate satisfaction with ABC. While 
perceptual measures such as these are useful for evaluating ABC implementation success, 
they provide no evidence that ABC adopters achieve higher operational or financial 
performance than non-adopters. Indeed, other studies suggest that many ABC adopters 
have abandoned their systems16, raising questions about the performance consequences of 
ABC implementation and use. 
4.2.4 Limitations and Research Opportunities Related to Non-F inancial Value Drivers 
Studies examining the value relevance of non-financial performance measures are 
plagued by many of the same limitations as the cost driver studies . In particular, the 
studies examine only one of many potential non-financial value drivers, and ignore 
interactions with other potential value drivers. These limitations can result in misleading 
15 See, for example, Shields, 1995; Swenson, 1995; Foster and Swenson, 1997; McGowan and Klammer, 
1997; McGowan, 1998; and Anderson and Young , 1999. 
16 Ness and Cucuzza (1995), for example, estimate that only 10% of firms that adopt ABC continue to use 
it. Gosselin (1997) finds that 36.4% of Canadian business units that adopted ABC later dropped the 
systems, while Innes and Mitchell (1991) find that 60% of ABC adopters in the U.K. stopped using the 
systems. 
inferences if non-financial measures are highly correlated (i.e., correlated omitted 
variable bias), or if different non-fmancial value drivers are complements or substitutes. 
To provide some ev idence on these issues, we asked senior executives from the 148 
fmancial service firms discussed earlier to rate the extent to which various performance 
categories are important drivers of their firms' long-term organizational success. Their 
responses are shown in Figure 4. Despite the emphasis on financial measures in 
accounting research, short-term financial performance ranks only fifth most important, 
behind customer relations, operational performance, product and service quality, and 
employee relations. Innovation and community relations also receive relatively high 
importance scores . 
*** Figure 4 about here *** 
The scores given to the non-financial performance categories are highly correlated. 
Seventy-two percent of correlations among the non-financial categories (not reported in 
the tables) are significant at the one percent level (two-tailed). For example, customer 
relations (the highest rated value driver) has a correlation of0.40 or greater with 
operational performance, quality, employee relations, innovation, and community 
relations, suggesting that these performance categories may be complementary. None of 
the correlations is significantly negativ e, providing no evidence that the categories are 
perceived to be substitutes. The significant relations among performance categories 
suggest that efforts to understand the value relevance of non-financial performance 
measures require researchers to examine a broader set of potential drivers and their 
interactions. 
Non-financial value driver studies also ignore contingent factors, even though it is 
likely that issues such as strategy, competitive environment, and customer requirements 
moderate the relation between these drivers and economic performance, and may explain 
the mixed results in prior studies. The survey data in Table 2, for example, document 
significant associations between perceived value drivers and organizational strategy. The 
table provides correlations between the financial service firms' strategy constructs 
(described in Table 1) and perceived value drivers (described in Figure 4). Customer-
related performance is perceived to be more important to long-term success when the 
firm follows an innovative strategy (INNOV), but is not associated with flexibility 
(FLEX) or the pursuit of existing customers or markets (PREDICT). When the firm 
pursues existing customers and operates in relatively predictable markets (PREDICT), 
community relations are believed to be more important. Flexibility and innovation, in 
turn, are both associated with higher importance scores for employee relations, quality, 
alliances, supplier relations, and innovation. Ignoring contingent factors such as these 
leaves our understanding of value drivers rudimentary. 
*** Table 2 about here *** 
An interesting question is the effect information technologies will have on the 
identification and importance of value drivers. Many enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems now contain "data mining" capabilities that allow companies to more easily 
identify statistical relations among performance measures. Integrated systems and the 
internet are also making data interchange easier, potentially reducing the costs associated 
with traditional cost drivers such as order taking and engineering changes. Anderson and 
Lanen (2000), for example, find that electronic data interchange with suppliers can 
mitigate some of the costs of complexity identified in earlier cost driver studies. Studies 
can extend their analysis to other forms of information technology and other managerial 
accounting topics. 
The use of"business models" that link multiple value drivers in a causal chain of 
leading and lagging performance indicators offers another research opportunity. Both the 
balanced scorecard and VBM literatures maintain that companies must develop explicit 
business models in order to identify which drivers have the biggest impact on value and 
to communicate how the organization' s objectives and strategies are to be achieved (e.g., 
Copeland et al., 1996; Kaplan and Norton, 1996).17 Yet little is know about how (or if) 
companies develop explicit business models or how these models vary depending upon 
the organization' s strategies, objectives, and organizational design. 
Finally, the performance effects of the balanced scorecard and other value driv er 
techniques remain open issues. Despite widespread adoption of these practices, we still 
have little hard evidence that company performance improves with their use. Additional 
research on the performance effects ofthese practices can make a significant contribution 
to the managerial accounting literature.18 
4.4 Developing Action Plans, Selecting Measures, and Setting Targets 
17 See Rucci et al. (1998) for an example of the causal business model developed by Sears, Roebuck and 
Company . 
18 It is likely that these practices are not equally beneficial in all settings, requiring researchers to examine 
the contingency factors that influence the performance effects (if any) from these techniques. See Gosselin 
Most economic and contingency theories in managerial accounting emphasize both 
the decision-making process and the development of performance measures and 
compensation plans that encourage employees to take the actions desired by the owners 
of the frrm. Similarly, the fourth step in the value-based management framework is 
developing action plans based on the value driver analysis and selecting the measures and 
targets that will be used to monitor their success. This section examines these issues by 
reviewing research on (1) the selection of investments and action plans, (2) the choice of 
performance measures, and (3) the setting of performance targets. 
4.4.1 Selection of Action Plans 
The choice of specific action plans has received virtually no attention in the 
managerial accounting literature, with one exception-the selection of capital 
investments. The majority of empirical studies in this area examine whether firms using 
sophisticated capital budgeting techniques such as discounted cash flow and internal rate 
of return perform better than firms using simpler methods such as payback period or 
accounting rate of return. Studies by Klammer (1973) and Haka et al. (1985) find no 
evidence that more sophisticated capital budgeting techniques improve performance. 
Haka ( 1987) extends these studies by testing a contingency theory of discounted cash 
flow (DCF) effectiveness. She finds that shareholder returns are higher when DCF 
techniques are used in predictable environments and are accompanied by the use of long-
term reward systems and decentralized capital budgeting processes. Other factors such as 
frrm strategy and environmental diversity have no significant impact on DCF 
effectiveness. 
(1997) and Krumwiede ( 1998) for studies examining some of the contextual factors associated with the 
adoption, implementation, and abandonment of activity-based costing systems. 
One criticism of these studies is their exclusive focus on quantitative, financial 
analyses, ignoring the many other types of information used in capital investment 
decisions. In contrast, Larcker ( 1981) examines the perceived importance of internal to 
external and financial to non-financial information in strategic capital budgeting, and 
their relation to decentralization, vertical integration, internal technology, and 
organizational size, as well as environmental dynamism, hostility, and heterogeneity. His 
results depend upon the stage of the decision process, with internal and external data 
equally important in problem identification and alternative development, and internal 
data more important in selection. Financial and non-financial information are equally 
important for all phases, but none of the contingency variables is statistically significant. 
Although these results suggest that non-financial and external information are important 
in capital budgeting, Larcker (1981) does not examine whether the performance effects of 
capital investments vary with the types of information used in the decision process. 
Carr and Tomkin's (1996) analysis of 51 strategic investment decisions in the 
automobile components industry examines the value-based management framework's 
hypothesis that the effective choice of actions plans depends upon the sources of 
competitive advantage and the fmn ' s value drivers. They find that "successful" 
companies place five times more attention on competitive issues, almost three times as 
much on value chain considerations such as customer relations, and twice as much on 
fundamental cost drivers as their less successful competitors, while devoting only a 
quarter as much attention to financial computations. Although intriguing, these results 
are limited by the authors ' use of subjective v ariable coding and subjectiv e performance 
evaluations, and by the lack of statistical tests. 
4.4.2 Choice of Performance Measures 
Considerably more attention has been paid to the choice of performance measures . 
Although the VBM framework suggests that performance measure choices should be 
driven in part by the results of value driver analyses, most empirical studies go directly 
from the firm' s organizational design, strategy, or technology choices to the choice of 
measurement systems. In general, these studies can be divided into two groups: (1) those 
examining a v ariety of information and control system attributes, and (2) those focused 
specifically on compensation criteria. 
Broad Control System Studies. Several studies in the first group investigate the 
association between organizational design issues and performance measures. Hayes 
(1977) finds that performance measures of highly interdependent subunits are most useful 
when they include measures to assess managers ' reliability, cooperation, and flexibility. 
Scott and Tiessen (1999) report a positive relation between the proportion of time spent 
in teams and the diversity of performance measures (both financial and non-financial) 
used in manufacturing plants. Scapen and Sales (1985), on the other hand, find no 
association between divisional autonomy and interdependencies and the financial criteria 
used to evaluate managerial performance, investment appraisal criteria (rmancial versus 
non-financial), or control over authorized capital projects. 
Chenhall and Morris (1986) examine the perceived usefulness of four management 
accounting system attributes: scope (e.g., external, non-fmancial, and future-oriented), 
timeliness, integration, and lev el of aggregation. Decentralization is associated with a 
preference for aggregated and integrated information, perceived environmental 
uncertainty with broad scope and timely information, and organizational 
interdependencies with broad scope, aggregated, and integrated information. Moreover, 
the effects ofPEU and organizational interdependencies are due in part to indirect 
associations through decentralization. Gul and Chia ( 1994), in turn, test a three-way 
interaction between PEU, decentralization, and managerial accounting system scope and 
aggregation. They find decentralization and the availability of broad scope and 
aggregated data associated with higher perceived managerial performance under 
conditions of high PEU, but with lower performance under conditions of low PEU . Other 
studies finding significant relations between environmental uncertainty and information 
system design include Gordon and Narayanan (1983) and Chong (1996). 
Consistent with most managerial accounting theories, strategy is also an important 
determinant of performance measurement and control systems. Simons (1987) finds that 
successful prospectors use a high degree of forecast data in control reports, set tight 
budget goals, and monitor outputs carefully, with little attention paid to cost control. 
Large prospectors emphasize frequent reporting and use uniform control systems that are 
modified frequently, while defenders use management control systems less actively. 
Guilding (1999) adds evidence that prospector firms and firms following a build strategy 
make greater use of competitor assessment systems and perceive these systems to be 
more useful than do defender firms or those following a harvest strategy. 
Studies examining the association between manufacturing strategies and performance 
measurement systems have also found systematic links among these choices. In general, 
organizations following advanced manufacturing strategies such as just-in-time 
production, total quality management, and flexible manufacturing are positively 
associated with the prov ision of non-financial measures and goals such as defect rates, 
on-time delivery, and machine utilization, as well as greater emphasis on non-financial 
measures in reward systems (e.g., Daniel and Reitsperger 1991; Banker et al., 1993; Ittner 
and Larcker, 1995; Perera et al. , 1997). However, empirical support for the hypothesized 
performance benefits from these measurement practices is mixed. Abernethy and Lillis 
(1995) find higher perceived performance in "non-flexible" manufacturers when greater 
emphasis is placed on efficiency-based measures, but no significant correlation between 
the use of efficiency measures and the performance of "flexible" firms. Sim and Killough 
(1998) find benefits from the provision of performance goals and performance-contingent 
incentive plans in TQM and JIT plants, but not from the provision of quality and 
customer-related performance measures. Perera et al. (1997) also find no relation 
between the use of non-financial measures and perceived manufacturing performance. 
Ittner and Larcker (1995), in turn, report positive effects from the prov ision of problem-
solving information and the use of non-financial reward criteria in organizations making 
little use of TQM practices, but no statistical association in organizations with extensive 
TQM programs. They conjecture that other TQM practices may substitute for these 
information and control mechanisms. 
Finally, the first group of studies suggests that production technology plays a role in 
the use and benefits of budgetary control systems. Merchant' s (1984) research indicates 
that process automation is positiv ely correlated with requirements for managers to 
explain variances and to their reactions to budget overruns. Dunk (1992) adds evidence 
that production subunit performance is high (low) when the use of budgetary controls and 
manufacturing automation are both high (low). Brownell and Merchant (1990) examine 
the influence of product standardization (e.g., one-of-a-kind vs. commodity) on the 
petformance effects of budget system design and use. Where product standardization is 
low, high budgetary participation and the use of budgets as static targets are more 
effective in promoting departmental petformance. The type of process (job shop to 
continuous flow) has little effect on the utility of budget systems. 
Overall, this set of studies generally supports theories that the choice of petformance 
measures is a function of the organization's competitive environment, strategy, and 
organizational design, but the performance effects of these choices remains uncertain. 
Compensation Studies. The second group of performance measure studies looks 
specifically at compensation plans. These studies examine many of the same factors as 
the first group of papers. Bushman et al. (1996) and Ittner et al. (1997) investigate the 
determinants of petformance measure choices in CEO bonus contracts. Significant 
factors explaining the weights placed on individual and non-financial petformance 
measures include the extent to which the firm follows a prospector strategy, the firm ' s 
growth opportunities (proxied by its market-to-book ratio), the adoption of strategic 
quality initiatives, the length of product development and product life cycles, industry 
regulation, and "noise" in traditional financial measures. 
Executive compensation studies suggest that many of these same factors are also 
associated with the relative weight placed on accounting and market (e.g., stock price or 
stock return) measures. 19 Ely (1991) finds that the choice between alternative accounting 
measures varies by industry, suggesting that these measures must be tailored to reflect 
industry-specific value drivers and competitive environments. Lambert and Larcker 
(1987) and Sloan (1993) demonstrate that the weight placed on market measures relative 
to accounting measures increases when accounting measures are noisier proxies of 
managerial effort, the ftrm has a higher growth rate, and managers hold less of the firm 's 
equity. In a similar vein, Lewellen et al. (1987) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) ftnd that 
stock-related compensation is higher when managers' time horizons need to be 
lengthened, while Bizjak et al. ( 1993) ftnd that high growth firms place greater weight on 
long-term components of compensation (option and stock holdings) than short-term 
components (salary and annual bonus). Clinch (1991) also ftnds that the weight on stock 
returns relative to return on equity increases with large ftrms' growth rates. Surprisingly, 
the weight on stock returns is lower in smaller f"rrms with high growth rates. Clinch 
(1991) ftnds similar results when stock returns are replaced with expenditures on research 
and development. 
While the prior studies examine the types of performance measures used for 
compensation, other studies examine the organizational level at which performance 
criteria are measured. Bushman et al. (1995) investigate the factors affecting the use of 
business unit versus corporate-level performance measures in business unit compensation 
plans. They f"md the use of corporate measures positively associated with organizational 
interdependencies. A similar study by Keating ( 1997) examines the use of division and 
ftrm-level measures for division manager performance evaluation. Signilicant factors in 
the choice of measures are divisional growth opportunities, organizational 
interdependencies, and the division' s size relativ e to the size ofthe company. 
Ittner and Larcker (2001) extend these studies to incentive plans for non-management 
workers. They find that informativeness issues such as those addressed in economic 
19 Although a full review of the executive compensation literature is outside the scope of this paper, 
comprehensive reviews on this topic can be found in Pavlik et al. (1993), Murphy (1998), and Bushman 
theories are key factors in the selection of performance measures for worker incentive 
plans. Howev er, they also find that other reasons for adopting the plan (e.g., improving 
pay-for-performance linkages and upgrading the workforce) play a role in worker-level 
performance measure choices, as do union representation and management participation 
in plan design. Moreover, the factors influencing the use of specific measures (e.g., 
accounting, cost control, quality, safety, etc.) vary, suggesting that the aggregate 
performance measure classifications commonly used in compensation research, such as 
the comparison of financial versus non-financial metrics, provide somewhat misleading 
inferences regarding performance measurement choices. 
Although none of the straight compensation studies examines performance 
consequences, related research suggests that organizations that align their incentive 
plans' performance measures with contingency factors such as those discussed above 
achieve higher performance. Simons ( 1987) and Govindarajan (1988) both find higher 
performance in organizations following defender or low cost strategies when bonuses are 
awarded for the achievement of budget targets. Similarly, Govindarajan and Gupta 
(1985) find that greater reliance on non-financial compensation criteria (sales growth, 
market share, new product and market development, and political/public affairs) has a 
stronger positive impact in units following a build strategy than in those following a 
harvest strategy. 
More important from a value-based management perspective, evidence on the 
benefits from tying compensation to EVA is mixed. As discussed earlier, studies by 
Wallace (1997) and Hogan and Lewis (1999) reach conflicting conclusions regarding the 
performance of firms adopting residual income-based compensation plans (such as EVA) 
and Smith (this issue). 
relative to the performance of control samples. In contrast, Wallace's (1998) survey of 
EVA users finds that firms using this measure for compensation purposes report greater 
awareness of the cost of capital, reduced average accounts receivable age, increased sales 
revenues, and a longer accounts receivable age than EVA users who do not use the 
measure for compensation. Given these mixed results, the benefits ofEVA-based 
compensation plans remain an open issue. 
4.4.3 Target Setting 
Prior empirical studies typically ignore one of the key aspects of performance 
measurement-target setting. Targets play an important role in selecting action plans and 
investments and evaluating performance. However, in contrast to the large body of 
behavioral accounting research on target setting, almost no empirical research has been 
conducted on this topic. What little research that exists focuses on the development of 
targets for compensation purposes. Merchant and Manzoni ( 1989) provide evidence on 
the achievability of performance targets in bonus plans. Their case study research 
indicates that business unit managers reached their targets eighty to ninety percent of the 
time, a result that is inconsistent with prescriptions in the managerial accounting 
literature suggesting that budget targets should be achievable less than fifty percent of the 
time to provide optimum motivation. Interviews with these managers indicates that 
highly achievable targets are desirable because they improve corporate reporting, 
resource planning, and control, and can still be highly motivating in combination with 
other control system elements. 
Murphy ( 1999) investigates the use of internal standards (budgets, prior year 
performance, and discretionary) versus external standards (peer group, timeless 
standards, and cost of capital) in executive incentive plans. He finds that companies are 
more likely to choose external standards (which are less easily affected by management 
actions) when prior-year performance is a noisy estimate of contemporaneous 
performance. Moreover, companies using budget and other internally determined 
performance standards have less variable bonus payments and are more likely to smooth 
earnings than those using externally determined standards. 
Indjejikian et al. (2000) fmd that managers' earned bonuses exceed target bonuses on 
average, and that target bonuses are adjusted upward (downward) in response to 
performance above (below) the standard in a prior year (known as the "ratchet effect"). 
In addition, the magnitude of the difference between earned and target bonus is related to 
proxies for information asymmetries between managers and their superiors. 
Unfortunately, none of these studies examines the performance consequences associated 
differences in target setting practices. 
4.4.4 Limitations 
The preceding studies generally support theories that the choice of action plans 
and performance measures is contingent on organizational characteristics. However, the 
studies have several shortcomings. First, each examines only one or a few uses of 
performance measures (e.g., compensation or capital justification) and ignores other 
potential uses (e.g., planning and problem identification) that may be equally or more 
important to frrm success. Second, the studies do not investigate the consistency in 
performance measures used for different purposes or the alignment between the measures 
and the firm's specific value drivers, despite claims that performance is enhanced when 
measurement systems are aligned with critical success factors (Dixon et al. , 1990; Lingle 
and Schiemann, 19%). Third, the studies overlook the quality of information used for 
decision-making and control (e.g., accessibility, timeliness, and reliability), even though 
information system characteristics are likely to influence decision-making quality and the 
incentive effects of control systems. 
We illustrate some of the issues raised by these omissions using survey data from 
the 148 financial service firms. Figure 5 provides information on the consistency 
between ( 1) the perceived importance of individual value drivers, (2) the performance 
measures used for identifying problems and developing actions plans, evaluating capital 
investments, and evaluating managerial performance, and (3) the development of formal 
goals for each performance category. We define a "measurement gap" as the difference 
between the perceived importance of each performance category and the extent to which 
(1) the performance category is used for internal purposes, and (2) formal strategic goals 
are established for the category. A firm is assumed to have zero "gap" if the score for 
internal usage or goal setting is greater than or equal to the perceived importance score. 
*** Figure 5 about here *** 
With the exception of financial and operational performance, substantial gaps 
exist for all ofthe higher ranked performance categories. The gaps vary across uses, 
indicating that extensive use of performance measures for one purpose does not 
necessarily imply that the measures are used for other purposes. The largest gaps relate 
to the use of customer, employee, and community measures for evaluating capital 
investments. Gaps for identifying problems and developing action plans generally are 
smaller than those associated with other uses. These responses raise a number of points 
that have been ov erlooked in prior studies. For example, do the same contingency factors 
influence the performance measures chosen for different purposes? Does consistency in 
the measures used for various purposes improve performance? Are some performance 
measure choices (e.g., performance evaluation and compensation) more important than 
others? Are greater "measurement gaps" associated with lower organizational 
performance? Attempts to address these questions not only require researchers to 
understand the value drivers within an organization, but also require studies to examine a 
much broader set of measurement choices than has been done in the past. 
Figure 6 compares the mean importance scores for each performance category to 
the respondents' rating of measurement quality for each category (where 1 = extremely 
poor quality of measurement and 6 = high quality of measurement). With the exception 
of short-term financial performance, measurement quality ranks lower than importance 
for each performance category. Particularly large differences exist for some of the most 
important value driver categories, suggesting that studies inv estigating the internal use 
and benefits of these performance measures are incomplete without considering how well 
this information is measured. 
*** Figure 6 about here *** 
Most prior studies hav e also assumed that the goal of performance evaluation and 
compensation systems is motivating employees to act in the manner desired by the 
owners of the firm. Although consistent with agency models, this assumption ignores 
other potential implementation goals such as attracting and retaining employees, shifting 
compensation risk from the ftrm to employees, and developing careers. As shown in 
Table 3, these goals can play a significant role in the design of performance evaluation 
and compensation systems. The table lists the relative importance placed on various 
objectives when conducting performance appraisals, designing non-management 
incentive plans, and dev eloping stock option plans. 20 The data in Panel A of Table 3, for 
example, indicate that most companies use performance appraisals for career 
development as well as for compensation. In fact, 61.4 percent of the respondents stated 
that the use of performance evaluations for career development is of equal or more 
importance than the evaluations ' use in determining compensation. 
*** Table 3 about here*** 
Panel B reports the importance companies place on various reasons for introducing 
non-management incentive plans. Although most plans are designed to improve business 
performance and profitability, the methods for achieving these objectives vary. The 
implementation reason receiving the largest number of "high importance" ratings is 
fostering teamwork, followed by better pay-performance linkage and enhancing 
communication of business objectives. In contrast, providing a method to allocate 
available award funds to high performing individuals and teams is among the least 
important reasons for implementing the plan. 
20 Survey data on performance appraisals were provided by the consulting fmn Watson Wyatt. Data on 
non-management incentive plans were provided by the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies 
Research. Th consulting firm iQuantic provided data on stock option plans in high technology companies. 
Panel C provides information on the reasons for adopting ongoing stock option plans 
in high technology firms. The most important factor by far is retaining existing 
employees. Providing competitive total compensation and attracting new employees also 
rank relatively high. Rewarding past performance, encouraging stock ownership, and 
rewarding specific project milestones or goals, on the other hand, rank among the lowest 
objectives. Taken together, the survey evidence in Table 3 indicates that employee 
motivation is only one of many reasons for implementing performance evaluation and 
reward systems. As Prendergast's (1999) agency model shows, these multiple objectives 
have major implications for the design and performance consequences of performance 
measurement and compensation plans- implications that should be factored into future 
empirical studies. 
In addition to the problems noted above, the studies reviewed in this section 
highlight some ofthe limitations associated with the data sources commonly used in 
managerial accounting research. These limitations are found throughout empirical 
managerial accounting studies, but are most evident in this set of papers due to the larger 
volume of published research on these topics. The majority of studies rely on one of 
three sources for their samples: (1) publicly available information, (2) surveys conducted 
by third parties (e.g. , consulting companies), and (3) surveys conducted by the 
researchers. Studies focused on the choice of performance measures in incentiv e plans, 
for example, typically use public disclosures on top executive compensation (which are 
legally required in proxy statements) or data collected by consulting firms. Both of these 
sources have limitations. By relying on proxy disclosures, compensation studies tend to 
place little emphasis on the methods used to reward lower-level employees, even though 
these compensation practices may have a greater influence on ftrm performance than 
executive reward practices. 
Another common problem with the use of public data sources is relatively weak 
independent or predictor v ariables. In many cases, proxies for the hypothesized 
predictors are only remotely related to the constructs of interest. For example, market-to-
book ratios have served as proxies for growth opportunities, strategy, intangible assets, 
and information asymmetries, ev en though it is unclear exactly what this measure is 
capturing. Studies can also be forced to use measures that are not at the same unit of 
analysis as the hypothesized associations. Bushman et al. (1995), for example, use 
fmancial statement disclosures on the firm's geographical and product diversification to 
test models on business unit performance measurement practices. Similarly, Keating 
(1997) uses industry -level proxies for some of the hypothesized divisional performance 
measure determinants because these issues were not addressed in his original survey. 
Survey data collected by third parties such as consulting firms are also subject to 
potential limitations. In most cases, there is no indication of the sample selection biases 
associated with these surveys. Studies rarely report the extent to which the survey 
responses are limited to clients of the consulting company conducting the survey, the 
overall response rate, or the biases in the types of responding organizations. Studies 
using third party data are also limited by the questions asked in the survey (which 
frequently have poor psychometric properties and are not be directly related to the 
variables of interest) and the lack of desired control variables (e.g., other organizational 
practices that may affect control system design or performance). Moreover, multiple 
indicators for each desired construct and multiple respondents for each question are often 
unavailable, making it difficult to determine the resulting constructs' reliability and 
validity. 
Surveys conducted by researchers are not immune to these problems. Young's 
(1996) critique of survey research in managerial accounting discusses a variety of 
methodological problems that are common in all survey research (e.g., response biases 
and construct reliability and validity). In addition, our review identified a number of 
limitations specific to managerial accounting studies. First, the surveys are often very 
narrow and ask few, if any, questions about organizational practices other than those 
being studied. But managerial accounting practices are rarely implemented in isolation 
from other organizational changes. As a result, correlated omitted variable problems are 
likely. 
The survey questions often lack specificity. For example, many performance 
measurement studies simply ask respondents the extent to which their firm uses a specific 
measure, without specifying the decision context (e.g., compensation, capital 
justification, or operational reviews). This makes it difficult to determine whether the 
responses are consistent (e.g., one manager may answer with respect to compensation, 
another with respect to manufacturing performance reports) or to interpret the results. 
Far too many surveys rely on respondents' perceptions oftheir firms ' use of 
managerial accounting or other organizational practices, rather than asking for "harder" 
responses such as the percentage of employees actually using a given technique, the 
weight placed on various performance measures when computing bonuses, or the number 
of allocation bases used in the cost accounting system. This problem is compounded 
when the study also uses perceptions of organizational performance or success (e.g., 
asking respondents to rate their performance relative to competitors or relative to their 
own expectations). Regressing perceived performance on perceived accounting system 
uses or benefits is likely to yield highly biased results. 
A final limitation in this set of papers is measuring the "match" or ''fit" between a 
managerial accounting practice and the firm 's organizational environment when 
assessing performance consequences. The frameworks discussed in Section 2 contend 
that accounting and control practices must be aligned with the organization' s 
environment. However, managerial accounting theories and frameworks provide little 
guidance on the correct method to measure the ' 'fit" between managerial accounting 
practices and other organizational characteristics. As a result, a variety of empirical 
methods have been used to measure these concepts, all of which have strengths and 
weaknesses. Perhaps the simplest technique is to estimate moderated regression models 
that include multiple interactions among the independent variables. However, this 
approach assumes a very specific functional form for the interactions, and is typically 
plagued by high levels of multicollinearity, making interpretation difficult. 21 
Cluster analysis has also been used to assess the complete "package" of 
accounting and control practices (e.g., Chenhall and Langfield-Smith, 1998; Ittner et al. , 
1999). Cluster analysis groups observations that are in close proximity in multi-
dimensional space for a given set of variables. By incorporating multiple managerial 
accounting practices, the resulting clusters identify different "configurations" of overall 
accounting and control system design, which can then be related to organizational 
performance. Researchers using this approach argue that cluster analysis provides a 
"systems approach" for evaluating managerial accounting practices. However, the 
selection of the "correct" number of clusters is more art than science, and the resulting 
clusters are often difficult to intetpret. Moreover, it is impossible to determine which of 
the multiple attributes and interactions captured in the clusters actually drive any 
observed performance differences. 
Other researchers measure system "misfit" as the deviation from some "optimal" 
system design. This approach requires the researcher to predict the "optimal" practices 
for the organization using some method such as regression analysis, and then use the 
residuals for each observation to estimate the distance the organization is from the 
estimated "optimal" practice. An alternative approach is to measure the deviation in a set 
of practices from the practices used by the highest performing organization, with the level 
of "misfit" operationalized using a summary measure such as Euclidean distance (e.g., 
Selto et al., 1995). The primary drawback ofthese approaches is the need to determine 
appropriate benchmark models for the choice of accounting and control practices (i.e., 
correct functional form for the prediction models, selection of appropriate contingency 
variables, and the accuracy of the assumption that observed practices, on average, are 
"optimal"). Further theoretical and methodological advances are needed to determine 
which of the many approaches for measuring ''fit" is most appropriate. 
4.4.5 Research Opportunities 
Notwithstanding the limitations discussed above, our limited understanding of the 
identification and justification of improvement opportunities, action plans, and 
investments raises a number of opportunities for research on the choice and performance 
consequences of these practices. One interesting topic is the role and benefits of "real 
option" techniques for investment justification. Dissatisfaction with discounted cash flow 
21 See Hartmann and Moers (1999) for a critique of moderated regression analysis in budgetary research. 
techniques has led to a growing literature focusing on the value of managerial flexibility 
in handling real asset investments, or "real options." Trigeorgis and Kasanen (1991), for 
instance, propose an options-based investment planning model that quantifies v arious 
strategic components of value, such as the flexibility embedded in real options, the 
synergy between groups of project taken simultaneously, and interdependencies among 
projects over time. Although Busby and Pitts (1997) find that decision-makers intuitively 
include real options thinking in some of their inv estment decisions, few firms have 
formal procedures for assessing these options. As more firms begin quantifying the v alue 
of real options, research can examine the valuation methods used and the applicability of 
the real option concept in different contexts. 
The growing use of multiple financial and non-financial performance measures 
for decision-making and compensation purposes leads to questions about how measures 
defined in different dimensions (e.g., money, time, satisfaction survey scores, defect 
rates, etc.) should be combined to form an overall assessment. One possibility is to allow 
the decision-maker to subjectively decide the weights. However, subjective assessments 
are prone to a number of potential biases (Prendegast and Topel, 1993). An alternativ e is 
to combine the measures using a pre-determined weighting formula. Difficulties with 
this option include determining the weights to place on the indiv idual measures, and 
preventing the game-playing associated with any explicit, formula-based rules (Kaplan 
and Norton, 1996). The growing emphasis on multiple measures for decision-making 
and compensation purposes makes the relative value of subjectiv e v ersus formulaic 
evaluations an interesting research topic. 
The benefits from including economic value measures in compensation plans is 
also an important issue. Although most value-based management advocates endorse the 
use of these measures at higher organizational levels, there is considerable debate as to 
their efficacy at lower levels. Stewart (1995), for example, asserts that the poor results 
from many EVA implementations are attributable to the fact that EVA use is not 
pervasive throughout the organization, especially for compensation decisions. Copeland 
et al. (1996), on the other hand, claim that lower-level managers should be evaluated and 
rewarded based on the specific financial and operational value drivers that are most 
closely tied to the managers ' actions. Garvey and Milbourne (2000) argue that EVA-
based compensation may be more beneficial when a company's EVA measures are more 
highly correlated with stock returns. Kaplan and Norton (1996), in turn, are unclear as to 
how the value drivers in the balanced scorecard should be used in compensation. 
Surveys suggest that VBM adopters are following a variety of compensation approaches 
(Ittner and Larcker, 1998a; KPMG Consulting, 1999), providing a natural opportunity to 
study the relative value of economic profit measures at various organizational levels and 
in different settings. 
A final topic is the setting of performance targets. 22 As noted above, this is a 
critical but under-researched area of managerial accounting. This topic is especially 
important given the rising use of non-financial measures, many of which are likely to be 
characterized by diminishing or negative returns at higher performance levels (e.g., Ittner 
and Larcker, 1998b ). A survey of customer satisfaction measurement by Arthur 
22 A related issue is the use and performance benefits of target costing practices in product development. 
Target costing is a method for designing products and services to simultaneously meet customer needs and 
achieve the company 's profit targets. Despite considerable discussion of the benefits from target costing, 
Koga (1998a, 1998b) finds only mixed evidence that the use of target costing practices by Japanese camera 
Anderson & Co. (1994), for example, finds that one of the most difficult problems in 
setting satisfaction goals is determining where these diminishing returns occur. 
Researchers can make a significant contribution by providing ev idence on the methods 
used to set financial and non-financial targets and the performance implications arising 
from these choices. Among the interesting research topics are the methods used to 
develop targets, the target's level oftightness, and the use and consistency of 
performance targets for different purposes (e.g., compensation, capital investments, 
identification of improv ement opportunities, and planning). Figure 6, for example, shows 
wide differences in the extent to which financial service firms establish formal goals for 
different performance categories, with particularly big differences between financial and 
non-financial measures. 
The methods used to establish goals for different types of measures can also vary. 
Table 4 illustrates this v ariety using survey data on non-management incentive plans .23 
The responses indicate that more than one method is often used to establish goals for a 
given type of measure, with the primary goal setting method varying by measure. In 
some cases, no targets are established; 11.4 percent of the respondents to this survey set 
no goal for financial performance and 30.3 percent set no goal for attendance. The wide 
variety of practices provides an excellent opportunity to increase our understanding of 
target setting methods and consequences. 
*** Table 4 about here *** 
manufacturers is associated with lower product development engineering hours and subsequent product 
manufacturing costs. 
23 Access to the confidential data on non-management incentive plans reported in Table 4 was provided by 
the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies Research. 
4.5 Evaluating Performance and Reassessing Organizational Objectives and Plans 
The final two steps in the VBM framework involve the evaluation of performance 
and the reassessment of organizational objectives, plans, and strategies when results do 
not meet expectations. The few related accounting studies on these issues indicate that 
the benefits from formal review and reconciliation procedures vary depending on a 
variety of contextual factors. 
Smith's ( 1993) examination of investment monitoring systems, for example, fmds 
that firms that employ these systems exhibit a positive relation between investment 
abandonments and performance, while firms without these systems exhibit a negative 
relation. Myers et al. (1991) also fmd that the initiation of sophisticated post-auditing 
procedures by firms using sophisticated capital justification techniques has significant, 
positive effects on frrm performance. However, Gordon and Smith (1992) find that 
performance is contingent on an appropriate "match" between post-audit sophistication 
and firm-specific variables such as the level of asymmetric information, capital intensity, 
capital expenditures, and insider ownership. 
Strategic control system studies indicate that the advantages of formal processes for 
determining whether a strategy is being implemented as planned and assessing whether 
the strategic results are those intended can actually be counter-productive in some 
environments. Field studies by Lorange and Murphy (1984) and Goold and Quinn (1993) 
indicate that many firms believe that informal strategic control practices are more 
appropriate in rapidly-changing environments because of difficulties pre-specifying the 
appropriate strategic action plans, targets, and performance measures. Consistent with 
these claims, Fiegener (1997) finds that the perceived effectiveness of strategic control 
systems is higher in firms following a cost leader strategy than in those following a 
differentiation strategy. Moreover, tight strategic controls increase the perceived 
effectiveness of strategic control systems in cost leader flrms, but hinder their 
effectiveness in differentiators. Similarly, Ittner and Larcker ( 1997) flnd that the 
development of formal strategic action plans and formal monitoring of strategic progress 
by executives and the board of directors is associated with lower performance in the 
dynamic computer industry, and no statistical impact in the automotive industry . 
4.5.1 Research Opportunities 
Given the mixed results in these studies, an interesting research issue is the 
applicability of the v alue-based management concept and related frameworks such as the 
balanced scorecard process. Although these frameworks typically are described as being 
universally applicable, the strategic control system studies provide evidence that these 
concepts may be more beneficial in some competitive and strategic settings than in 
others. Goold and Quinn (1993), for example, discuss a number of factors that influence 
the choice of strategic control practices, including the length of time-lags between actions 
and results, the potential for linkages with other businesses in the flrm 's portfolio, the 
level of risk, and the sources of competitive advantage in the business. Researchers can 
investigate whether these and other factors actually influence the choice of and benefits 
from formal strategic control systems. 
A related issue is the role of formal versus informal controls in implementing and 
monitoring value-based management systems. The negative results for some of the 
formal strategic control practices in the studies discussed above suggest that these 
practices can actually be detrimental. Enhanced understanding of the applicability and 
performance consequences of formal versus informal control systems in different settings 
can make a significant contribution to the managerial accounting literature. 
Researchers can also determine whether all six steps in the VBM process are 
needed to achieve superior performance. Studies to date have examined only one or a 
few of the links in the process, and provide no evidence on whether the broad set ofVBM 
practices adds greater value jointly than indiv idually. Progress in understanding the costs 
and benefits of managerial accounting practices such as these will require a much broader 
perspective that captures the many interdependencies among these practices . 
Finally, the question arises as to whether the "new" value-based management 
techniques, including related methods such as activ ity-based costing, the balanced 
scorecard, and EVA, are fundamentally different than (or superior to) traditional 
accounting and control practices or are merely fads promoted by management consultants 
and other third-parties. Malmi ( 1999) refers to changes in managerial accounting 
practices that are pushed by consultants, business schools, and mass-media publications 
as "supply-side" accounting innovations. His study of activity-based costing diffusion in 
Finland indicates that the initial ABC adopters implemented the systems in order to 
improve efficiency and effectiveness. However, later adopters tended to implement ABC 
for ''fashion" or ' 'fad" reasons encouraged by the widespread promotion of ABC by third-
parties. Additional insight into the adoption, use, and performance implications of 
"supply-side" accounting innovations can make a significant contribution to our 
understanding of managerial accounting practice. 
5. Future Directions 
This section presents our views on the steps needed to push managerial accounting 
research forward and enhance a study's probability of acceptance in a leading accounting 
journal. In particular, we discuss some of the approaches available to address common 
problems encountered in managerial accounting research, including motivation and 
hypothesis development, sample selection and construct measurement, model 
specification, and endogeneity. 
5.1 Motivation and Hypothesis Development 
For managerial accounting research to advance, researchers must move away 
from motiv ating their papers based on enthusiasm in the business press, and must indicate 
why the practices or research settings are interesting from a theoretical standpoint. 
Consider the current enthusiasm for e-commerce research. Unless researchers can 
articulate how this industry contributes to theory development or testing, e-commerce 
studies are unlikely to have a lasting impact on accounting research. 
In many cases, economic theories cannot fully explain the observed practices. 
Instead, researchers must draw upon a broader set of disciplines when developing and 
testing hypotheses. Merchant et al. (2000), for example, provide an insightful review of 
behavioral and economic approaches to compensation research, and the limitations that 
arise when these multiple perspectives are ignored. 
5.2 Sample Selection and Construct Measurement 
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, commonly used data sources such as public 
disclosures, surveys, and third party studies each have strengths and weaknesses. 
Researchers must trade off the data sources' relative strengths and weaknesses when 
examining a given research question by considering issues such as sample size, data 
quality, and data collection costs. More importantly, researchers must attempt to 
minimize the weaknesses as much as possible. For example, an extensive literature on 
survey research methods exists that can be used to improve the quality of survey-based 
accounting studies. Survey researchers can also include more questions requiring "hard" 
responses, rather than relying solely on perceptual measures. 
Multiple data sources or research methods (e.g., data analysis, interviews, and 
experiments) can be used to prov ide a consistent body of evidence that increases the 
reader's confidence in the results.24 Ittner and Larcker (1998b), for example, use 
customer-level data from a telecommunications firm, branch-level data from a bank, and 
publicly av ailable firm-lev el data to examine the relation between customer satisfaction 
measures and future financial performance. Despite the substantial differences in the 
three data sets, the analyses yield similar results, suggesting that the fmdings are not 
driven by data limitations or sample biases. 
In a similar vein, survey data can be combined with hard performance data from 
publicly av ailable sources to enhance the credibility of performance tests. For example, 
detailed performance data are publicly available for many industries such as banks and 
hospitals. Growth in the internet is making even larger volumes of financial and non-
financial performance data readily accessible to researchers. Replacing self-reported 
organizational success measures with actual performance results can help increase the 
reputation of survey-based research in the accounting community. 
24 See Bimberg et al. (1990) for a discussion ofthe advantages of multiple research methods in empirical 
managerial accounting research. 
Greater use of detailed data from a single or small number of organizations is also 
recommended. Although small sample studies will always be subject to complaints about 
their generalizability, such studies may provide the only means for obtaining the quantity 
and level of data needed to answer many managerial accounting research questions. 
Excellent examples of small sample empirical studies in managerial accounting include 
Merchant and Manzoni (1989), Anderson (1995), and Banker et al. (1996; 2000). 
No matter what data sources are selected, greater effort is needed to deal with 
measurement error. Typically, measurement error in the criterion (or dependent) v ariable 
leads to reduced statistical power for hypothesis testing, whereas measurement error in 
the set of (correlated) predictor (or independent) variables leads to inconsistent parameter 
estimates with a bias that generally is difficult to sign. Some managerial accounting 
research attempts to demonstrate the psychometric properties of the measures used for 
hypothesis testing (e.g., reliability and construct validity). 25 The most common approach 
is to use a weighted composite of multiple measures for each theoretical construct, after 
demonstrating that the selected measures are unidimensional via principal component 
analysis and have a sufficiently high Cronbach alpha (see Nunnally [1967] for a 
discussion). The primary assumption ofthis approach is that a weighted combination of 
related measures will have lower measurement error than any indiv idual measure (i.e., 
exhibit higher reliability). 
Another approach that can deal with measurement error and provide evidence on 
construct validity (i.e., whether the indicators actually measure what they purport to 
25 The least sophisticated approach is to use a single indicator for each theoretical construct. Unless the 
researcher is very sure that the observed indicator measures the theoretical construct without error 
(undoubtedly a very rare occurrence), this approach will almost always be susceptible to inconsistent 
parameter estimates. 
measure) is latent variable models. Two basic types of latent variable models have been 
used in accounting research: maximum likelihood common factor models (see Lambert 
and Larcker [1987] for an application) and partial least squares models (see Ittner et al. 
[1997] for an application). Each method can provide hypothesis tests using latent 
variable estimates that have reasonable reliability and construct validity, thereby 
mitigating the inconsistency in parameter estimates from individual variables with 
considerable measurement error. Moreover, sophisticated latent variable models can 
incorporate simultaneous equation specifications, some time series aspects, and 
interactions among the latent variables (Ping, 1996; Li et al., 1998). 
5.3Model Specification 
A key to improving managerial accounting research is better model specification. 
Although model specification should be driven by the theory being tested (Luft and 
Shields, 2000), relatively few studies articulate this linkage. Advances in empirical 
managerial accounting research not only require these linkages to be made explicit, but 
also require researchers to address three major econometric issues: (1) endogeneity, (2) 
simultaneity, and (3) functional form. We discuss these issues in the following sections. 
5.3.1 Endogeneity 
One key limitation in most empirical research is the endogeneity of the predictor 
(or independent) variables. 26 Endogeneity is caused whenever a predictor is also a choice 
variable that is correlated with the random error in the structural model. This 
misspecification causes the parameter estimates to be inconsistent, which renders the 
26 Interestingly, critiques of the managerial accounting literature seem to be much more focused on 
endogeneity than other areas of empirical accounting research (e.g., capital marlcets work). However, the 
discussion of endogeneity is equally relevant to any type of quasi-experimental research, and is not solely a 
managerial accounting limitation. 
interpretation of the model and hypothesis tests problematic. The econometric solution to 
endogeneity is using a method such as two-stage procedures that rely on instrumental 
variables to generate predicted variables that are uncorrelated with the error term. 27 
Unfortunately, instrumental variables are very difficult to identify for most managerial 
accounting research. Since many organizational choices are interrelated, it is often hard 
to identify exogenous instruments that apply to one organizational choice and not to 
another. Even in studies that adopt two-stage procedures (e.g., Keating, 1997; 
Holthausen et al. , 1995), the selected " instruments" also appear to be choice variables 
(e.g., "instruments" such as the investment opportunity set, as measured by the market-to-
book ratio, are almost certainly endogenous). Thus, regardless of authors' claims or the 
apparent sophistication of the methods used in the study, it is an open question as to 
whether the typical application of instrumental variable estimation methods causes more 
problems than it solves. 
Another problem with this econometric approach is that the explanatory power 
from the regression of the endogenous variable on all (assumed) exogenous variables is 
frequently quite low. As discussed by Nelson and Startz (1990) and Bound et al. (1995), 
modest levels of explanatory power produce a variety of undesirable econometric 
properties. In particular, the instrumental variable estimates are biased in the same 
direction as the OLS estimates. Thus, although the ''textbook solution" to endogeneity is 
known, the practical application of instrumental variable estimation to managerial 
27 Many alternative estimation techniques are available in addition to two-stage least squares (e.g., three-
stage least squares or maximum-likelihood methods). Given the instrumental variables, two-stage least 
squares is simple to implement and has a variety of advantages relative to more complicated methods (e.g., 
Challen and Hagger, 1983). 
accounting research is problematic and is likely to produce misleading statements about 
the researcher' s ability to address the endogeneity problem. 
One particularly difficult endogeneity problem arises when the researcher wants 
to assess whether some managerial accounting choice is associated with improved 
organizational performance. As discussed in Demsetz and Lehn (1985), if all 
organizations in the sample are optimizing with regard to the accounting system choice, 
there should be no association between organizational performance and the observed 
(endogenous) choice, once the exogenous determinants ofthe choice are controlled in the 
structural model. Under this (rather extreme) scenario, empirical researchers should not 
even attempt to explain organizational performance because any statistically significant 
coefficient on the managerial accounting choice will only occur because of measurement 
error, misspecification of functional form, inadequate set of exogenous controls, etc. 
Taken to the extreme, managerial accounting researchers using secondary data should 
never use performance as the dependent or criterion variable because the results are not 
interpretable due to econometric problems caused by endogeneity.28 
From a real world standpoint, it is difficult to believe that the statement 
"everybody optimizes all the time" characterizes actual managerial accounting practice. 
As Milgrom and Roberts (1992, p. 43) note: 
Paradoxically, the very imperfections in the rationality of people and in the 
adaptability of organizations denied by many simple economic theories are 
necessary in proving that rationality-based theories are descriptively and 
prescriptively useful. With perfect rationality, one would rarely expect to observe 
two organizations in substantially the same circumstances making substantially 
different choices, so there would be no possibility of testing what kinds of 
organizations perform better .... A more defensible position ... is that people 
28 This appears to be a very common critique by reviewers in the managerial accounting area. In many 
cases, this critique is deemed a "fatal" flaw of the research, and causes the paper to be summarily rejected. 
learn to make good decisions and that organizations adapt by experimentation and 
imitation, so there is at least ''fossil evidence" available for testing theories. 29 
Since managerial accounting researchers are ultimately interested in providing at 
least some insight into which practices hav e favorable effects on organizational 
performance, one approach is to admit that at any given point in time, a cross-sectional 
sample (such as that typically used in managerial accounting research) will be composed 
of organizations that vary with respect to the optimal level of practice adoption. As 
Milgrom and Roberts ( 1992) suggest, all organizations may be dynamically learning and 
mov ing toward the optimal level, but a cross-sectional sample will consist of 
observations that are distributed around the optimal choice. The observed cross-sectional 
variation in practices prov ides a means to assess the performance consequences of 
managerial accounting choices. 
For example, assume that the research question of interest is whether activity-
based costing improves firm performance. In addition, assume that the percentage of 
operations using activity-based costing (ranging from zero to 100 percent) is measured 
for a cross-section offrrms. This analysis can be conducted in two steps. First, the 
researcher can hypothesize and estimate a model for the choice of a managerial 
accounting practice (e.g., activity-based costing is commonly hypothesized to be related 
to product mix, competition, and other determinants). This model is assumed to be the 
same for each firm, exhibits the correct functional form, has predictor variables that are 
measured without error, and includes all relevant (exogenous) predictor variables. The 
residuals for each observation (either positive or negative) estimate the distance the firm 
is off the systematic model describing "optimal" practice. Second, firm performance is 
29 Similar ideas have been advanced in the managerial accounting literature. See, for example, Dunk 
regressed on the absolute value of these residuals (or perhaps separately for positive and 
negative residuals ifthe slope coefficients are expected to be different). If activity-based 
costing affects firm performance and firms (on average) have optimally chosen their cost 
systems, the coefficient on the absolute value should be negative (i.e., either over-
investing or under-investing in activity-based costing is costly for the firm). 
4.3.2 Simultaneity 
A related issue is the simultaneous choice of managerial accounting and other 
organizational attributes. In theory, organizations should simultaneously select (or 
match) their managerial accounting system, organizational design, compensation system, 
and other related process and structural aspects of the firm (e.g., Otley, 1980; Milgram 
and Roberts, 1995; Brickley et al., 1997a). However, most of the reviewed work 
examines these issues by arbitrarily selecting one construct as endogenous (i.e., the 
dependent variable) and the remaining constructs as exogenous (i.e., the independent 
variables). Alternatively, the few attempts to estimate a non-recursive structural model 
simply assume that the instruments needed to identify the system (i.e. , satisfy the rank 
and order conditions) are adequate. Unfortunately, as discussed above, many of these 
"instruments" do not seem to be exogenous variables that are uncorrelated with the error 
terms in the system of equations. Nevertheless, the use of simultaneous equation 
approaches to test the theoretical models of managerial accounting can alleviate some of 
the simultaneous equation bias. Moreover, although the philosophical basis of causality 
is problematic in a cross-sectional setting where the analysis is based solely on the 
correlation (or covariance) matrix, structural models involving simultaneous equations 
(1989) and Bjornenak (1997). 
allow the researcher to assess which hypothesized causal model is actually consistent 
with the observed data. 
4.3.3 Functional Form 
Managerial accounting theories and frameworks often contend that the relations 
among accounting and control practices, other organizational design choices, and 
performance can be characterized by complex interactions among the practices and non-
linearities (e.g., the costs from more elaborate managerial accounting systems may 
exceed the benefits at higher levels of system complexity). This is particularly true of the 
frameworks discussed in Section 2, which argue that accounting and control practices 
must "match" or "fit" the organization' s environment. 
In contrast, the functional form of most prior work is generally a simple linear 
structure, typically with few if any interactions among the independent variables. 30 
Although a linear structure is straightforward to interpret, it may not be sufficient to 
capture the complex nature and associated performance consequences of many 
managerial accounting problems. For example, it would be useful to know if managerial 
accounting practices have the same relation with organization performance over the 
entire variable range (i.e., are there backward bending portions of the function?). Giv en 
our limited theoretical understanding ofthe appropriate functional form of structural 
models related to managerial accounting practices, it seems incumbent on researchers to 
entertain alternative specifications and to identify the form consistent with the observed 
data. 
30 Luft and Shields (2000) provide an excellent review of the functional forms used in empirical managerial 
accounting research. 
One (exploratory) technique that can detect nonlinearities is additive 
nonparametric regression (described as "modem regression methods" in Splus, 1991, 
chapter 18; Tibshirani, 1988). Nonparametric regressions use a variety of smoothing 
procedures to flexibly model additive nonlinear relationships between the predictors and 
the criterion (or dependent) v ariable. Whereas linear models assume that the criterion 
variable is linear in each predictor, additiv e models assume only that each predictor 
affects the criterion in a smooth way (see Ittner and Larcker [1998b] for an accounting 
application). An advantage of this general approach is that linear structures will be 
observed in the statistical and graphical analysis only if they are appropriate (i.e., this 
approach will not force the researcher to adopt a complex model when it is not 
appropriate). 
Another promising exploratory technique for dealing with both higher-order 
interactions and nonlinearities is recursive partitioning (e.g., Breiman, 1984; Clark and 
Pregibon, 1992). Recursiv e partitioning attempts to explain the variation in the criterion 
variable by estimating a sequence of partitions of the predictor v ariables. At each step, 
the technique splits a subset of the sample into groups by selecting and partitioning the 
predictor v ariable that most improv es the homogeneity of the resulting groups. As the 
splitting continues, this method generates a tree-like structure of sequential nodes and 
branches. For example, the first split in the tree may indicate that the v ariable that 
explains the most variance in manufacturing plant performance is the use of activity-
based costing, with plants in the two upper quartiles of ABC usage displaying the highest 
results. However, within the upper quartiles, the splits may indicate that results are 
enhanced even further when ABC is accompanied by contingent compensation, but are 
reduced when the plant does not allocate decision rights to production workers. In this 
way, recursive partitioning has the ability to detect complex, higher-order interactions 
that are virtually impossible to hypothesize in an a priori manner. The resulting model 
can also be used to assess the likely nonlinear combinations of predictor variables that 
yield the greatest performance effects (see Ittner et al. [1999] for a managerial accounting 
application). 
Finally, dynamic aspects of managerial accounting practices largely have been 
ignored in prior studies. Many argue that an organization's environment is best 
understood as a highly interdependent system, as opposed to a simple recursive causal 
model. For example, important parameters in one part of the performance model can 
change in response to shifts in other parts of the organization's internal and external 
environment. Feedback loops among parameters can also exist. These issues are almost 
impossible to examine in a regression framework, and generally require some type of 
system dynamics method (e.g., Forrester, 1961; Senge, 1990). An excellent example of a 
system dynamics application in empirical research is the analysis of the performance 
effects of total quality management at Analog Devices (Sterman et al., 1997). It would 
seem almost impossible to understand the paradox between significant quality 
improvements and substantial declines in financial performance experienced by Analog 
Devices without closely examining the dynamic, interrelated organizational processes 
using methods such as system dynamics. The use of these procedures in managerial 
accounting research appears very promising. 
6. Conclusions 
The objectives of this paper are three-fold: (1) to critically review existing 
empirical research in managerial accounting, (2) to highlight some ofthe methodological 
shortcoming in these papers, and (3) to offer suggestions for future research. We conduct 
our review within the context of a value-based management framework that incorporates 
many of the concepts contained in other conceptual models such as contingency theories, 
economics-based organizational design frameworks, and the balanced scorecard process. 
Although the majority of empirical studies support the associations proposed in these 
models, our review also highlights a number of gaps and inconsistencies, providing 
natural opportunities for empirical research. 
A final observation from our review is the lack of integration between financial 
and managerial accounting research. With the possible exception of compensation 
studies, accounting researchers have treated these fields as independent, even though it is 
likely that these choices do not stand alone. For example, the value-based management 
literature argues that the value driver analysis should not only influence the choice of 
action plans and the design of control systems, but should also affect external disclosure 
requirements (e.g., Black et al., 1998; KPMG Peat Marwick, 1999). This claim is 
consistent with calls in the financial accounting community for greater disclose of 
information on key value drivers (e.g., American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 1994; Wallman, 1995). Without greater integration offinancial and 
managerial accounting research, our understanding of the choice and performance 
implications of internal and external accounting and control systems is far from complete. 
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Table 1 
Correlations among strategy proxies for 148 fmancial service frrms. Pearson correlations 
above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below. Two-tailed p-values in parentheses. 
FLEXIBLE INNOV PREDICT BTOM 
FLEXIBLE 1.000 0.499 0.130 -0.052 
(0.000) (0.118) (0.534) 
INNOV 0.490 1.000 0.140 -0.115 
(0.000) (0.090) (0.170) 
PREDICT 0.109 0.135 1.000 -0.082 
(0.188) (.102) (0.328) 
BTOM -0.084 -0.040 0.055 1.000 
(0.314) (0.634) (0.516) 
BTOM equals the firm's book-to-market ratio, commonly used as an inverse measure of growth 
opportunities or innovation strategies. Book-to-market data are obtained from Compustat. Other 
data are gathered from a survey of senior financial service executives during the fourth quarter of 
1999. FLEXIBLE, INNOV, and PREDICT are developed from principal components analysis of 
11 questions on the firms' strategies and competitiv e environment. FLEXIBLE equals the average 
standardized response to four questions asking the respondent's agreement with the statements "We 
respond rapidly to early signals of opportunity in our market," "We have greater flexibility to 
respond to changes in our environment than our competitors," "We hav e the ability to adjust 
capacity within a short period of time," "we have the ability to change product or service offerings 
rapidly" (scales ranging from 1 =strongly disagree to 6 =strongly agree). INNOV equals the 
average standardized response to four questions asking the respondent's agreement with the 
statements "We offer a more expanded range of products and services than our competitors," "We 
are frrst to market with new products or services," "We respond rapidly to early signals of 
opportunity in our market," and "We expect most of our future growth in profits to come from our 
new product and service offerings." PREDICT equals the average standardized response to three 
questions asking the respondent's agreement with the statements "We are most active in developing 
the markets we currently serve, rather than entering new markets with our products or services," 
"We operate in markets for our products or services that are highly predictable," and " It is easy to 
forecast how actions of competitors w ill affect the performance of our organization." One question 
asking whether the firm is more cost efficient than its competitors did not load greater than 0.40 on 
any factors and is excluded from the analysis. 
Table 2 
Spearman correlations between the organizational strategy variables and perceived value 
drivers in 148 fmancial service frrms. 3 
Strategy 
FLEX INNOV PREDICT 
Value Drivers: 
Financial 0.074 0.021 0.111 
Customer 0.037 0.174** 0.142* 
Employee 0.247*** 0.337*** 0.142* 
Operational 0.069 0.12 0.184** 
Quality 0.191 ** 0.198** 0.149* 
Alliances 0.231 *** 0.258*** 0.041 
Suppliers 0.182** 0.299*** -0.014 
Environmental 0.119 0.146* 0.144* 
Innovation 0.222*** 0.384*** 0.033 
Community 0.121 0.127 0.173** 
a. ** *. * *. * = statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
BTOM 
-0.080 
0.060 
0.041 
0.140* 
-0.030 
0.132 
-0.023 
0.104 
0.138* 
-0.136 
See Table 1 for the definition of the strategy variables (FLEX, INNOV, PREDICT, and 
BTOM) and Figure 4 for the defmition of the value driver categories (Financial, Customer, 
Employee, Operational, Quality, Alliances, Suppliers, Environmental, Innovation, and 
Community). 
Table 3 
The reasons for implementing performance evaluation systems, non-management incentive 
plans, and stock option plans a 
Panel A: The relative use of performance evaluations for career development and compensation (1 
= exclusively to develop careers, 4 = equally to develop careers and determine compensation, 7 = 
exclusively to determine compensation) 
Percentage of respondents providing the following scores: 
1.0% 
2 2.0% 
3 13.1% 
4 45.3% 
5 25.2% 
6 11.3% 
7 2.0% 
Panel B : The importance of possible reasons for adopting non-management incentive plans (%of 
respondents). 
No Moderate High 
importance importance importance 
1 2 3 4 5 
Enhance communication of 12.5 8.0 20.0 27.4 32.0 
unit objectives 
Encourage intrapreneurship 29.3 14.8 28.3 17.7 9.9 
Foster teamwork 8.8 4.5 16.3 30.0 40.5 
Improve morale/employee 8.9 8.9 25.4 32.3 24.4 
relations 
Better pay-performance 10.5 4.3 19.0 28.2 38.0 
linkage 
Reduce entitlement mentality 31.5 13.9 20.6 21. 1 12.9 
Make labor cost more variable 25.2 13.0 19.6 24.7 17.4 
with organizational 
performance 
Become more competitive in 28.8 19.9 21.1 17.3 12.9 
total compensation 
Provide method to allocate 49.0 9.1 13.9 13.0 15.0 
awards to high performing 
indiv iduals/ teams 
Assist in recruiting 40.1 22.0 21.2 11.1 5.7 
Improve employee retention 30.4 15. 1 26.0 19.7 8.8 
Upgrade quality of workforce 31.6 13.5 27.8 18.0 9.1 
Improve business performance 4.2 3.0 9.9 26.3 56.7 
and profitability 
Table 3 (continued) 
Panel C: Mean relative rankings ofthe reasons for adopting stock option plans in high 
technology firms.b 
Retain employees 
Provide competitive compensation 
Attract employees 
Link indiv idual to company performance 
Reward past contributions 
Encourage stock ownership 
Reward project milestones or goals 
90.50 
74.75 
67.22 
53.58 
36.96 
30.29 
27.61 
a_ Survey data on performance appraisals were provided by the consulting firm Watson Wyatt. 
Data on non-management incentive plans were provided by the Consortium for Alternative 
Reward Strategies Research. The consulting firm iQuantic provided data on stock option plans in 
high technology companies. 
b_ Respondents were asked to rank these objectives and to give the same ranking to 
objectives with equal importance. The responses were recoded so that a score of 100 
would be achieved if an item was ranked most important by all companies. 
Table 4 
Methods for developing baselines or goals for the perf01mance measures used in non-management incentive plans. The table reports the 
percent of respondents who use the measure and develop baselines or goals using that method. a 
Type of Measure 
ACCT PROD QUAL SAFETY ATTEND COST VOLUME 
Historical results 52.2 76.4 67.4 66.2 35.9 59.1 61.7 
Business plan 42.0 17.5 17.4 17.5 21.3 41.3 32.6 
Benchmarking 13.2 15.6 15.3 18.8 13.4 10.4 n.a.c 
Engineered standard n.a. 15.3 5.3 4.5 n.a. 3.1 4.7 
Government standards 0.5 n.a. 3.2 7.1 n.a. 1.5 n.a. 
Customer satisfaction surveys n.a. n.a. 27.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
None 11.4 2.1 3.5 9.0 30.3 6.8 4.7 
a The data in the table were obtained from surveys conducted by the Consortium for Alternative Reward Strategies Research. 
b. ACCT = accounting measures, PROD = productivity measures, QUAL = quality and customer measures, SAFETY = safety measures, 
ATTEND = attendance measures, COST - cost reduction measures, and VOLUME = volume measures. 
c n.a. denotes responses that were not allowed in the survey instrument. 
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Mean Perceived Importance of Selected Performance Measurement 
Categories from a Survey of 148 Senior-Level Executives of Financial 
Service Firms Conducted During the Fourth Quarter of 1999 
Perceived I m portancea 
aThe respondents answered the following question: "To what extent do y ou view the following categories 
of performance measurement as important drivers oflong-term organizational success?" Perceived 
importance was measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not applicable to our organization, 
one labeled as not at all important, and six labeled as extremely important. For purposes of coding, a 
response of zero (i.e. , not applicable) was treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., not at all 
important). 
The precise definitions for each performance category provided to the survey respondents were: Financial -
- short-term financial performance (e.g., annual earnings; return on assets), Customer- relations with 
customers (e.g. , market share; customer satisfaction; customer loyalty/retention), Employee- relations with 
employees (e.g., employ ee satisfaction; employee turnover; work force capabilities), Operational--
operational performance (e.g., productivity; on-time delivery; safety; cycle time), Quality - product and 
service quality (e.g., defect rates; refund/returns; quality awards), Alliances- alliance with other 
organizations (e.g .. , joint marketing; j oint research and development; joint product design), Suppliers -
relations with suppliers (e.g., on-time delivery; input into product'service design), Environmental -
environmental performance (e.g ., EPA citations; environmental compliance), Innovation - product and 
service innov ation (e.g., new product development; product development cy cle time), and Community-
community (e.g. , public image; community involvement). 
Figure 5 
Mean "Gap" Between Perceived Importance and Use of Selected 
Performance Measurement Categories from a Survey of 148 Senior-Level 
Executives of Financial Service Firms Conducted During the Fourth Quarter 
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t::l Identifying Problems/Developing Action Plans 
ffil Evaluating Managerial Performance 
Iii Evaluating Capital Investments 
•Goals Established 
•Measurement "Gap" is the difference between the score for the perceived importance of each performance 
category and the score for the extent to which the performance category is used for internal decision-
making or the score for whether formal stmtegic goals are established for each category. 
For perceived importance, the respondents answered the following question: "To what extent do you view 
the following categories of performance measurement as important drivers oflong-term organizational 
success?" Perceived importance was measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not 
applicable to our organization, one labeled as not at all important, and six labeled as extremely important. 
For purposes of coding, a response of zero (i.e., not applicable) was treated as equivalent to a response of 
one (i.e., not at all important). 
For internal decision-making, the respondents answered the following three individual questions: "To what 
extent is information pertaining to the following categories used for identifYing problems and improvement 
opportunities and developing action plans?; evaluating major capital investment projects?; and evaluating 
managerial performance? Usage was measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not 
applicable to our organization, one labeled as not used at all, and six labeled as used extensively. For 
purposes of coding, a response of zero (i.e., not applicable) was treated as equivalent to a response of one 
(i.e., not used at all). 
For goal setting, the respondents answered the following question: "To what extent has your organization 
established formal stmtegic objectives (or goals) for the performance categories?" Goal development was 
measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not applicable to our organization, one labeled as 
no goals established, and six labeled as explicit goals established. A response of zero (i.e., not applicable) 
was treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., no goals established). 
A respondent organization is assumed to have a zero "gap" if the score for internal usage or goal setting is 
greater than or equal to the perceived importance score. 
The precise definitions for each performance category provided to the survey respondents were: Financial -
- short-term financial performance (e.g., annual earnings; return on assets), Customer - relations with 
customers (e.g., market share; customer satisfaction; customer loyalty/retention), Employee- relations with 
employees (e.g. , employee satisfaction; employee turnover; work force capabilities), Operational--
operational performance (e.g., productivity; on-time delivery; safety; cycle time), Quality- product and 
service quality (e.g. , defect mtes; refund/returns; quality awards), Alliances- alliance with other 
organizations (e.g .. , joint marketing; joint research and development; joint product design), Suppliers-
relations with suppliers (e.g., on-time delivery; input into product/service design), Environmental -
environmental performance (e.g., EPA citations ; environmental compliance), Innovation - product and 
service innovation (e.g. , new product development; product development cycle time), and Community -
community (e.g. , public image; community involvement). 
Figure 6 
Mean Perceived Importance of Selected Performance Measurement 
Categories from a Survey of 148 Senior-Level Executives of Financial 
Service Firms Conducted During the Fourth Quarter of 1999 
Perceived lmportancea I Measurement Qualityb 
Em Perceived importance of performance category 
~Measurement quality for performance category 
"The respondents answered the following question: "To what extent do you view the following categories 
of performance measurement as important drivers oflong-term organizational success?" Perceived 
importance was measured using a seven-point scale, with zero labeled as not applicable to our organization, 
one labeled as not at all important, and six labeled as extremely important. A response of zero (i.e., not 
applicable) was treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., not at all important). 
bThe respondents answered the following question: "How well does your organization measure 
information in the following categories?" Measurement quality was measured using a seven-point scale 
with zero labeled as not applicable for our organization, one labeled as extremely poor quality of 
measurement, and six labeled as high quality of measurement. A response of zero (i.e., not applicable) was 
treated as equivalent to a response of one (i.e., extremely poor quality of measurement). 
The precise definitions for each performance category provided to the survey respondents were: Financial -
- short-term financial performance (e.g., annual earnings; return on assets), Customer- relations with 
customers (e.g., market share; customer satisfaction; customer loyalty/retention), Employee- relations with 
employees (e.g. , employee satisfaction; employee turnover; work force capabilities), Operational--
operational performance (e.g., productivity; on-time delivery; safety; cycle time), Quality- product and 
service quality (e.g. , defect rates; refund/returns; quality awards), Alliances- alliance with other 
organizations (e.g .. , joint marketing ; joint research and development; joint product design), Suppliers-
relations with suppliers (e.g., on-time deliv ery; input into product/service design), Environmental-
environmental performance (e.g., EPA citations; environmental compliance), Innovation- product and 
service innovation (e.g. , new product development; product development cycle time), and Community -
community (e.g. , public image; community involvement). 
